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A Comprehensive Wealth Tax
DAVID SHAKOW* AND REED SHULDINER**
l.

INTRODUCTION

Income conventionally is defined as the sum of consumption and
any change in net worth. This definition highlights three likely bases
for a tax: income, consumption, and net worth. Tax rates can be applied to essentially any base (or combination of bases) to raise the
revenue that government requires.
The current U.S. federal tax system is based mainly on what is
called an income tax. 1 While the definition of income given above is
not used uniformly by the U.S. income tax system-for example, the
tax system generally waits for property to be sold before it takes account of a change in value-the income tax relies to a significant degree on the income of taxpayers as its base. As for alternative bases,
in the past 30 years there has been considerable discussion of a consumption tax that might replace the income tax. Little serious work
has contemplated replacing the income tax with a wealth tax. Our
project is to describe what a wealth tax might look like and what its
(primarily distributional) consequences might be.
The wealth tax that we describe consists of a fiat rate tax on most
categories of wealth. Exemptions ensure that low wealth individuals
would pay no tax. The wealth tax also includes a tax on earned income (generally referred to as "wages"). The wage component can be
viewed as a tax on human capital, consistent with a complete definition of wealth, or as a quasi-independent wage tax. The wage tax also
would have only one rate.
We find that the wealth tax leads to a distribution of taxes over
most of the income range that is roughly the same as the current income tax. Based on the data we have analyzed so far, the combined
* Professor of Law (Emeritus), University of Pennsylvania Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The authors would like to thank participants at workshops at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School and Georgetown Law School, at a symposium sponsored by the
New York University Tax Law Review, especially the commentators, Michael Knoll and
James Repetti, and a conference sponsored by the Harvard Law School Fund for Tax and
Fiscal Research. We also would like to thank the University of Pennsylvania Research
Foundation and the University of Pennsylvania Law School for the use of research funds.
1 The other major source of federal revenue is the payroll tax used to fund Social Security and Medicare.
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taxes produce a significantly greater burden than does the income tax
on very low income individuals and produce a significantly lesser burden on very high income individuals. We find the lower burden on
higher income individuals a disturbing fe ature of the tax. We view the
results so far, however, as only preliminary. We strongly suspect that
the data we used omits substantial amounts of wealth owned by upper
income individuals. Thus, we expect future work is likely to show increased taxes would be paid by upper income individuals under a
properly structured wealth tax.
II.

WHY C o N siDER

AW

E A LTH

TAx?

There are essentially two reasons for a careful consideration of a
wealth tax. First, one might consider a wealth tax to be superior to
both the current income tax and to widely considered alternative
taxes, such as a consumption tax. Second, even if the wealth tax is, for
one reason or another, an inferior tax, nevertheless, consideration of
the wealth tax may provide useful insight on other taxes. In particular, the similarity between the wealth tax and the income tax sheds
light on the income tax.
For purposes of comparing the wealth tax with its alternatives, we
adopt the standard framework for evaluating tax systems, and consider effects on equity, efficiency, and administrability. We recognize
that, theoretically, these considerations blend together within the
framework of a social welfare function, but believe that, as a practical
matter, the separation is useful. The following Subsections discuss the
merits of a wealth tax under these criteria.
A.

Equity

The classic equitable justification for the income tax is that a tax
should be based on ability to pay and income is the best measure of
ability to pay. 2 On the face of it, however, a person's wealth appears
to be as fair a basis for distributing a tax as her income. Both greater
wealth and greater income clearly are correlated with greater ability
to pay. In fact, income from capital and wealth are flip sides of the
same concept. Income from capital is simply the increase in value of
the stock of wealth.
Another justification used for the income tax is that it is a form of a
benefits tax. 3 A person's income is dependent on society's infrastructure that supports economic activity. Hence, those who earn more
2

3

See, e.g., D avid F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 149-51 (1986).
See id. at 150.
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income reasonably can be asked to provide greater support for society's infrastructure. A wealth tax can be justified along the same
lines. A person's ability to accumulate and protect wealth is dependent on society's infrastructure just as much as is his ability to earn
income. Thus, wealth provides a reasonable basis for taxation.
Those who find an income tax attractive from a theoretical standpoint might prefer a wealth tax to an income tax because, in the real
world, it is very difficult for an income tax to measure income accurately. Indeed, if all capital produced the same yield , an ideal wealth
tax would be equivalent to an ideal income tax. Since capital produces widely divergent yields, a wealth tax still can be viewed as
equivalent to an income tax levied on the average income from capital, rather than on the actual income realized from that capital.
A wealth tax also taxes capital that is not productively employed.
Thus, a wealth tax can be viewed as a tax on potential income from
capital. With respect to human capital, taxes based on potential earnings are rejected in order not to tax people on what they could earn if
they choose to earn less than they are able. Putting aside practical
considerations, such an approach offends our sense of respect for individual freedom. The arguments against taxing potential income from
inanimate capital are much weaker. If two people earn $20,000 per
year in salary, but one has $100,000 stuffed in a mattress, it does not
seem unreasonable to say that the one with the cash in the mattress
has a greater ability to pay a tax than the other.
A wealth tax should be compared not only to the income tax, but
also to a possible consumption tax. An equitable basis for a consumption tax is that consumption measures the value that members of society extract from society. 4 If that is the correct basis for allocating the
tax burden, an income tax is wrong, since income reflects what people
contribute to society. A consumption tax also is believed by some to
be more equitable because it does not discriminate between people
who choose to consume early and those who choose to consume later
in life. 5 People who feel strongly about these arguments are unlikely
to be in favor of a wealth tax because it suffers from the same weaknesses in this regard as does its cousin, the income tax.
A major criticism of consumption taxes is that the most obvious
forms of consumption taxes, such as sales taxes, seem to be inherently
regressive since the percentage of income devoted to consumption de4 See William Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1165-66 (1974); Edward J. McCaffrey, The Uneasy Case for Wealth
Transfer Taxation, 104 Yale L.J. 283, 339 (1994).
5 See Bradford, note 2, at 162-66.
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creases as mcome and wealth increase. 6 R ealistic consumption tax
structures have been developed, however, th at impose a progressive
tax rate structure on a person's annual consumption .7 Thus, some
have argued that consumption taxes are not inherently more regressive than income taxes. 8 Nevertheless, many of the consumption tax
proposals that seem to be politically most acceptable are significantly
less progressive than the income tax. 9 The potential strength of the
wealth tax over the consumption tax is that it may be able to achieve
progressivity with a flat rate structure.
Progressivity in the income tax primarily comes from two sources.
First, progressivity is achieved by exempting income under a certain
level. The current income tax exempts a basic level of income through
the combination of the standard deduction and the personal exemption.10 Second, the income tax has progressive rates, beyond the implicit zero bracket inherent in an exemption amount.l 1
Progressivity is defined generally as an increase in the average tax
burden with increased income. 12 Once one moves away from the income tax, an obvious question is whether progressivity should be defined according to some other base, such as wealth or consumption.
6 The sentence in the text appears to be internally inconsistent, since it starts with the
assumption that consumption is the correct tax base yet it tests regressivity against a base
of income or wealth. In fact, most discussions of the progressivity of a consumption tax
assume that something other than consumption (generally, income) should be the base
against which the progressivity of the tax is measured. Bradford, note 2, at 162 (discussing
equity of a consumption tax in terms of income).
7 See, e.g., Bradford, note 2, at 319 (discussing consumption-oriented modification of
the income tax base).
s Id. at 3 ("Consumption taxes are often thought to be regressive; in fact, they can be as
progressive as one wants"). An alternative line of argument is that the proper comparison
is not made on an annual basis, but over a lifetime, and that when so viewed, a fiat rate
consumption tax is lifetime proportional, not regressive. See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise Taxes, 79 Am. Econ . Rev. 325
(1989). We intend to explore the lifetime issue more fully as we develop this project.
9 E.g., William G. Gale, Building a Better Tax System: Can a Consumption Tax Deliver
the Goods?, 95 TNT 218-95 (Nov. 7, 1995), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
("Although the fiat tax is more progressive than a VAT, it is more regressive than the
current system").
10 IRC §§ 63, 151.
It IRC § 1. Progressivity also is achieved through the earned income credit. IRC § 132.
We treat the earned income credit, however, as independent from the income tax. In theory, there is no reason why a wealth tax could not be combined with a similar earned
income tax credit. Additionally, progressivity currently is achieved through a variety of
provisions that provide benefits for lower income individuals that are phased out for higher
income individuals. See, e.g., IRC § 21 (dependent care credit), § 24 (child tax credit),
§ 25A (Hope and lifetime Learning credits), § 151(d) (phaseout of personal exemption),
§ 219 (individual retirement account), § 221 (deduction for interest on educational loan),
§ 408A (Roth IRA).
12 It is also possible to define progressivity in terms of marginal rates , but it seems more
useful to us to define it in terms of average rates.
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For now , however, we continue to use income as the base against
which progressivity is measured . 'vVe are not entirely comfortabie with
using income as the base for defining progressivity. In particular, if
one accepts that wealth is the correct base on which to impose a tax,
there seems to be little reason that a wealth tax should be judged
against income.
A ccepting both the definition and desirability of progressivity, we
believe a reasonably structured wealth tax can achieve progressivity
by income class that is comparable to that of the income tax. We say
"reasonably structured" because we are certain that an appropriate
combination of rates and exemptions can make a wealth tax as progressive as an income tax. Comparable arguments are made for a consumption tax. What we view as potentially special about a wealth tax
is that we believe it can be structured as a flat rate tax, and still have
the benefits of progressivity beyond what the credits provide.
The intuition behind our belief that suitable progressivity can be
achieved with a single (nonzero) rate is that substantial income from
wealth effectively goes untaxed under the current income tax system.
We think it quite reasonable to believe that much of that low-taxed
wealth is held by the wealthiest (or, if you will, the highest income)
individuals. Hence, one of the primary questions is whether, by bringing these assets into the system, we have made our base sufficiently
progressive, at least as compared to the current income tax, that a fiat
rate tax on wealth (coupled with appropriate exemptions and a fiat
rate tax on wages) can yield progressivity comparable to the current
income tax. Our expectation has been that, if such progressivity can
be achieved, the wealth tax may be preferable to the current income
tax from a fairness perspective because it is likely to apply more uniformly within wealth (and income) classes.
Another way to express this intuition is to say that, as adjusted gross
income (AGI)-the primary measure of income in the current income
tax-increases, wealth increases disproportionately. Some idea of the
relationship between net worth, earned income, and AGI can be obtained from Figures 1 through 3_13 Figures 1 and 2 show net worth and
earned income as a percentage of AGI by AGI category. 14 Figure 2 is
the same as Figure 1 except that it only includes data on individuals
with AGI greater than $15,000.
13 The data in these figures comes from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF).
See Section V for a description of the SCF. See Section VILA. for a discussion of net
worth . See Subsection VII.B. for a discussion of the definition of earned income. Figures
13 and 14 in the Appendix show aggregate figures for net worth and earned income by
AGI category.
14 The percentages shown in Figures 1 through 3 are computed as weighed averages of
the percentage for each individual within an AGI class.
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As can be seen from the figures, earned income slowly but steadily
declines as a fraction of AGI. After a precipitous fall in the $1,000 to
$15 ,000 range of AGI , net worth steadily increases as a percentage of
AGI. The increase becomes quite steep between the $100,000 to
$200,000 category and the $200,000 to $500,000 category and then
drops somewhat for those with AGI over $500,000. Also shown in
Figures 1 and 2 is taxable net worth as a percentage of AGI. Taxable
net worth is defined as net worth minus housing equity up to $1 million. As the graphs show, housing becomes less important as net
worth increases.
Figure 3 adds an additional line, net worth as a percentage of
earned income. Since earned income is very close to AG I, the line
closely tracks the line for net worth as a percentage of AGI. Net
worth as a percentage of earned income significantly diverges from
net worth as a percentage of AGI only for individuals with AGI over
$1 million.
Since the wealth tax described here consists of two flat rate components, a tax on wages and a tax on capital, it follows from Figures 1
through 3 that the tax on wages, standing alone, would be a regressive
tax when measured against AGI while the tax on capital would be
progressive. Since we can vary the relative contributions of each component of the tax (by varying their rates), we are able to achieve any
measure of progressivity between that arising solely from a wage tax
and that arising solely from a tax on capitaP 5 In either case, further
progressivity can be achieved by providing for a credit or exemption. 16
B.

Efficiency

Efficiency refers to the effects of a tax system on the smooth functioning of a market economy. Any realistic tax system interferes with
a pure market economy by altering prices and hence altering decisions
that participants in the market would have made absent a tax system.l7 Economists evaluate the effects of a tax system to see how seriously the tax system interferes with economic decisionmaking. They
also try to determine whether the tax system encourages decisions
that are good for the economy.
To explore the efficiency of a wealth tax, we first consider some of
the characteristics of a wealth tax. We then compare the wealth tax to
its primary alternatives, an income tax and a consumption tax.
Additional progressivity could be achieved by applying negative tax rates to wages.
See Section V for a discussion of credits and exemptions.
17 Taxes that do not vary with behavior, such as head taxes, usually are seen as efficient.
Generally, however, they are not viewed as fair or practical.
15

16

l0

FIGURE

0
0

3

AGI AND NET WOHTI-1 AS
AGI CATEGOHY (AGI > $15,000)

NET WORTH AND EARNED INCOME AS A P ERCENTAGE OF
PERCENTAGE OF EARNED INCOME BY
1600% .....-

""'"-----~···--·

_g

A

~-···--·--··-··--·--···--·-·····-----······-···-··-~--·····-···-···-···--·~·······

1400%1----------- ---------------------- -- --------------------------- --------------------4
)>

1200%

-l -

()

_~ - ·- · Earned income I AGI

0

- - - Net worth I AGI
- - - - - - Net wort h I earned income

<

:;j
:N

r': .....

1000%

.

I

"

800%

(~

;:
;.·

-l

',

tTl

...._
'

i

.....

',

z

.
~·----·.:

(/)

I

1.'

/

4000/.

0

- -

- --..

.......

.......

___ _

/

------ - . ....
.................... -- ....

-

/

;: .
_____ J.'
.. -- - .,

tTl

-l

/ /

-

<
tTl
~

/•

;.'

600%

:r:

tTl

_.

)>

~

:r:
~

><

. . ...
200%11- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - :

r---- ---------------0% +-------~--------~------~--------~------~--------T-------~--------T-------~--------4
15-20K
20-25K
25-30K
75-1OOK
40-SOK
50-75K
100-200K
200-SOOK
SOOK-1 M
30-40K
> 1M
AGI Category

V1

0

-..}

508

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:

We argue below that a wealth tax differs from other taxes on capital
primarily in its lump sum nature. Before characterizing the wealth
tax, however, it is helpful to look at the difference between an ex ante
wealth tax and an ex post wealth tax.
1.

Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Wealth Taxes

An ex ante wealth tax is a tax on wealth measured at the beginning
of each period while an ex post wealth tax is imposed on wealth measured at the end of each period. 18 Generally, the difference between
the two taxes is unimportant for two reasons. 19 For one thing, under
certain conditions described below, the two taxes generate identical
outcomes. More importantly, if the taxes are imposed on a periodic
basis, they can be made entirely equivalent.
a.

One-Period Wealth Tax

Consider first the one-period wealth tax. Assume an individual has
a fixed pool of savings, S, that she plans to invest. She expects a return of z on her savings, where z may be a safe rate of return or may
be a random variable representing a risky return. The amount of her
investment does not affect the rate of return. If subject to an ex ante
wealth tax at a rate Tw, she would be able to invest, after tax:
S X (1 - T w)
(1)
At the end of the investment period, she would have available to
consume:
S X (1 - Tw) X (1 + z)
(2)
By contrast, with an ex post wealth tax, she would be able to invest
the entire S. At the end of the investment period, prior to tax, she
would have:
S x (1 + z)
(3)
After tax, she would be able to consume:
S X (1 + z) X (1 - Tw)
( 4)
Expressions 2 and 4 are always equal. Subject to the qualifications
discussed below, the ex ante and ex post wealth taxes produce identical outcomes from the viewpoint of the taxpayer. 20
18 Although it need not be the case, we assume the tax is payable when the wealth is
measured.
19 The discussion in the text assumes that the tax is proportional and that the tax rate
does not change over time.
zo From the viewpoint of the government, the two taxes are not necessarily identical
because in the case of the ex ante tax, the government can choose to invest the revenues in
any manner available to it, while in the case of the ex post tax, the government's tax revenues depend on the outcome of the investment. Essentially, the ex post tax makes the
government a partner in the taxpayer's investment. In theory, the government could make
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While the ex ante and ex post wealth taxes produce identical outcomes, they obviously do not produce identical tax payments. Since
the tax payments are different, particularly where the return is risky, it
may seem unintuitive that the ex ante and ex post wealth taxes produce identical outcomes. In particular, in the ex ante case, the tax
paid is certain , while in the ex post case, the tax paid is uncertain,
depending on the outcome of the risky return. The question, however, is not whether the tax paid is the same, but whether the ultimate
after-tax outcome is the same. The reason the outcome is the same is
quite simple. The ex post tax captures a fixed percentage of both initial wealth and the return from the investment. The ex ante tax directly captures the same fixed percentage of initial wealth. In
addition, since the ex ante tax has to be paid up front , it reduces the
size of the investment, thus reducing the same fixed percentage of the
return as with the ex post tax.
As mentioned above, the conclusion that the taxes are identical
must be qualified in at least two ways. First, the ex ante and ex post
taxes are not the same if there are net additions or subtractions to
savings during the period from sources other than investment earnings. In particular, net additions to savings during the taxable period,
such as from saved wages, escape the ex ante tax, while net subtractions from savings, such as due to consumption out of savings, escape
the ex post tax.
Second, the two taxes do not treat inframarginal returns identically.21 In particular, the excess of the inframarginal returns over the
marginal returns (the "excess inframarginal returns") is treated just
like additions to savings out of wages. Excess inframarginal returns
escape an ex ante wealth tax, but are taxed as part of wealth by an ex
post wealth tax. The following example shows the difference in treatment between ex ante and ex post wealth taxes.

Example 1: T, who has $1,000 in savings, has a unique opportunity to invest in a project. The project is expected to
have a 100% return. The most that T can invest in the project is $1,000, although he could invest less. If he invests the
full $1,000, he will have $2,000 at the end of the period. T
also can borrow and lend at the market rate of 10%. If there
is an ex post 10% wealth tax, Twill pay $200 at the end of
the ex post tax equivalent to the ex ante tax by selling the taxpayer's investment short and
investing the proceeds in its preferred investment. Alternatively, the government could
make the ex ante tax equivalent to the ex post tax by investing the tax proceeds in the same
investment as the taxpayer.
21 As discussed more fully below, inframarginal returns are above-market returns available in limited amounts to particular investors on particular proj ects.
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the period, and be left with $1,800. If there is an ex ante tax ,
T will pay $100 up front , leaving only $900 for the investment. T , however, can borrow $100 to pay the tax, and ,
therefore, invest a full $1,000 in the project. A t the end of
the period , Twill have wealth of $2,000 from the project, but
will owe $110 on the loan used to pay the ex ante tax. After
paying off the loan, Twill be left with $1,890. Thus, T will be
better off under the ex ante , rather than the ex post tax.
While it is clear from the example that the ex ante and ex post
wealth tax impose different burdens on inframarginal returns, it is
worth exploring the nature of the difference. It is straightforw ard to
show that the ex ante wealth tax is equivalent to an ex post wealth tax
that exempts the excess inframarginal return.22 The following example illustrates the point.
Example 2: Ts $2,000 ex post wealth in Example 1 can be
divided into three components: the original investment
($1,000) , the marginal return ($100), and the excess inframarginal return ($900). A 10% wealth tax that exempted
the inframarginal return would collect $110. T would be left
with $1 ,890, exactly the same amount as under the ex ante
wealth tax.

With either tax, if the tax is imposed in future periods, the excess
inframarginal return becomes part of the subsequent tax base to the
extent that it is not consumed. In summary, in the case of a one-period tax, the ex ante and ex post taxes are very similar, but not
identical.
22 The relationship be tween the ex ante and ex post tax can be shown algebraicall y.
Assume an individual has an opportun ity to invest an amo untS at an inframarginal return
g. The individu al can borrow and lend at the margin al rate r. For convenience, assume
that the individual has initi al wealth equ al to S. If the re is an ex ante we alth tax at a rate
T,., the ex ante tax liability is:
Tno= S X Tw.
(1)
where the subscript 0 indicates the time of the payment and the supe rscript a indicates the
ex ante tax. If the individual borrows to pay the tax, the tax liability at Time 1 is:
PI = (1 + r) X S X Tw·
(2)
If there is an ex post wea lth tax at the same rate, then after investing S at rate g, T owes:
P , = S X (1 + g) X T.,..
(3)
The superscript p indicates the ex post tax. Rewriting the equation , one obtains:
pi = (1 + r) X S X T w + (g - r) X S X T w.
(4)
Substituting:
PI = r , + (g - r) X s X Tw·
(5)
The final term is the excess inframarginal re turn multiplied by the tax rate . Thus, the ex
post tax, P 1, is equal to the ex ante tax adjusted for the earlier payment. PI , plus a tax on
the excess inframargin al return .
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Periodic Wealth Tax

The more important case is where the wealth tax is imposed over
multiple periods. With a periodic wealth tax, the differences between
an ex ante and ex post tax essentially evaporate. Since the beginning
of each period is also the end of the prior period, the differences between the two wealth taxes arise only for the first and last periods. In
particular, an ex ante we al th tax captures inherited wealth, while an ex
post wealth tax captures assets remaining at death (that is, amounts
bequeathed or wealth at the termination of the tax). Since an ex ante
wealth tax could treat death as the beginning of the fin al taxable period and an ex post wealth tax could treat birth as the end of the first
taxable period, the two taxes could be made identical. Given the similarity between ex ante and ex post wealth taxes, we do not always
distinguish between the two.
I n any case, a periodic wealth tax exempts wealth that is both
earned and consumed during the taxable period. It is worth noting
that the shorter the taxable period, the less wealth can escape the tax
through consumption. In this Article, we assume an annual weaith
tax, although a shorter period could be used. 23
2.

Wealth Taxes as Lump Sum Taxes

The key to understanding the economic effect of a wealth tax is to
understand its nature as a quasi lump sum tax. As discussed below,
the tax is lump sum in the sense that given the decision to save, the tax
does not depend on the return from the investment. 24 The tax is not
lump sum in the sense that the amount of the tax depends on the
amount that the individual chooses to save rather than consume.
To see the quasi lump sum nature of the tax, consider a simple
model with an ex ante wealth tax (remembering the general equivalence between ex ante and ex post wealth taxes). Assume that T earns
y at time zero. T must make a decision to consume some or all of his
earnings and to save any amount not consumed. Consumption is immediate and there is an ex ante wealth tax at a rate Tw on any amount
not consumed. It is clear that the wealth tax increases the price of
future consumption relative to current consumption and has the effect
23 In theory, one could adopt a continuous wealth tax. See Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and
Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 Yale L.J. 1817 (1990) (discussing the
optimal taxable period under the income tax). There is no necessary connection between
the frequency of valuation and the frequency of collection or filing. For example, one
could have a tax based on average end-of-month valuations, with annual filing, and quarterly payment of estimated tax.
24 The statement in the text ignores investments in human capital, which may or may not
be taxed at the same rate depending on the human capital portion of the tax.
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of discouraging savings. In this regard, the wealth tax acts like an income tax. 25
On the other hand, consider the decision as to how to invest. The
individual must pay a fixed charge, T w x W, irrespective of how the
individual chooses to invest his wealth. In this sense, it is a lump sum
tax and lump sum taxes are efficient in that they do not distort prices
and, therefore, economic decisions. 2 6
The quasi lump sum nature of the wealth tax is explored more fully
in the following comparison between the wealth tax and income and
consumption taxes.
3.

Comparison of Wealth Taxes With Income and Consumption
Taxes

In order to compare the effect of wealth taxes on capital, it is useful
to divide income from capital into several categories: the real riskfree return, the return to risk, and inframarginal returns. 27 In addition, although not strictly a return to capital, the taxation of inflationary returns needs to be examined. Except where specifically noted,
the following discussion assumes that the tax in question is proportional, that is, the effects of progressivity are ignored.
a.

Real Risk-Free Return

Consider first a world where all capital yields the same certain real
rate of return r. In such a world, an income tax would burden income
from capital at the statutory rate. A consumption tax, on the other
25 A wealth tax reduces the return to savings and hence increases the price of future
consumption relative to current consumption. Therefore, people would tend to substitute
away from future consumption towards current consumption (the substitution effect). On
the other hand, a wealth tax also increases the amount of savings required to fund any
given level of future consumption (the income effect). Thus, a wealth tax, like an income
tax, may increase the level of savings. See generally Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Lecture 3: Taxation, Savings and Decisions Over Time, in Lectures on Public Economics 62 (1980).
26 To be more precise, there will be no substitution effect, although there may be a
wealth effect. The wealth effect, however, does not carry with it an excess burden or deadweight loss. Given, however, the presence of other distortions in the economy, including
the wealth tax itself, it cannot be said that it is necessarily more efficient not to distort the
investment decision.
27 Although it is standard in the literature to speak of the real risk-free return, generally
it is not possible to invest at a real risk-free rate. For example, a one-year U.S Treasury bill
may have near zero default risk, but it has inflation risk. Moreover, the riskiness of the
Treasury bill depends on the desired timing of consumption and on the other assets held by
the individual. For example, if the individual desires to use the proceeds of the investment
in less than or more than one year, the Treasury bill also has interest rate risk. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, note 19, at 102-04.
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hand, would impose no burden on capitaJ.2 8 The consumption tax
does not burden savings because when a taxpayer chooses to defer
consumption, he also is permitted to defer tax on the deferred consumption. The value of the tax deferral is exactly equal to the extra
tax imposed on the deferred consumption. 29
A wealth tax, like the income tax, imposes a tax on capital. As argued above, the wealth tax is best viewed as a lump sum tax on capital. If the rate of return r is constant, the wealth tax T w operates
exactly like an income tax T w according to the following relationship:

(1 + r)

r

r

(1 + r)

t;

X f;. 30

28 Generally, under a consumption tax , a tax is imposed on consumption out of investment earnings , but, as explained below, there is no burden from the tax. Depending on
implementation, a consumption tax may burden pre-existing capital. The fact that a consumption tax does not burden capital is we ll-known in the literature. See, e.g., Bradford,
note 2, at 162-66; William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974) ; Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk ? Does it
Matter?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 377 (1992); Michael Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575 (1979); Alvin C. Warren , Jr., How Much Capital
Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax? , 52 Tax L. Rev. 1
(1996) [hereinafter Capital Income]; Alvin C. Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be
Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 80 Yale L.J. 1081 (1980).
29 The fact that a consumption tax does not burden capital can be shown algebraically.
Consider, a person who has S dollars that he can consume currently (time 0) or invest for
one period (time 1). Assume that there is a consumption tax at the tax-inclusive rate Tc.
For a discussion of the difference between a tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive rate, see note
31. If spent now, the person has the following consumption C and tax liability T:
Co = S X (1 - Tc)
To= S X Tc.
If saved for one year, the amount available for spending increases by a factor of (1 + r), for
total savings of (1 + r) x S. The individual the n has consumption and tax liability of:
C 1 = (1 + r) X S X (1 - Tc)
T1 = (1 + r) X S X T c.
By substitution:
C 1 = C0 x (1 + r)
T 1 = T0 x (1 + r).
Thus, the amount available for consumption at Time 1 is exactly the quantity (1 + r) multiplied by the amount available at time 0. In other words, deferred consumption increases at
the rate of return , with no diminution for taxes. Thus, there is in effect no burden on
savings.
Put another way, the amount of the tax liability increases only by the rate of return , and
therefore the tax savings from deferring consumption exactly pays for the tax on the incremental consumption from savings.
30 The factor of r adjusts for the fact that the wealth tax is on the entire wealth , while the
income tax is only on the yield . The factor of (1 + r) adjusts for the fact that the ex ante
wealth tax is paid one period earlier than the income tax.
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Where the rate of return is not constant, the two taxes diverge. In
particular, as the risk-free rate rises (falls), the wealth tax becomes a
decreasing (increasing) proportion of the income from the asset. One
implication of the lump sum nature of the wealth tax is that individuals will become more sensitive to changes in the interest rate, because
the tax will not blunt the effect of the change. These results are easy
to see with a series of examples.
Example 3: Assume that T earns $100 that he either must
spend this year or save and spend next year on consumption.
Any amounts saved earn interest at 10%.
Income Tax: Under a 40% income tax, T pays $40 in taxes
and can consume $60 currently or save the $60. If he saves
the $60, he earns $6 and pays an additional tax of $2.40 on
the interest. His consumption then is $63.60, 6% more than
he could have consumed in the first period. His return on
savings is reduced from a 10% pretax rate to a 6% after-tax
rate (a 40% reduction corresponding to the 40% mcome
tax).
Consumption Tax: Under a 40% (tax-inclusive) consumption tax, T can consume $60 currently and pay tax of $40. 31
Alternatively, T can save the $100, leaving him with $110 after earning a year's interest. He then can consume $66, paying a tax of $44. By saving, T increases his after-tax
consumption by the full 10% rate of return. Therefore, the
consumption tax does not burden savings.
Wealth Tax (With Wage Tax): Assume a 3.64% wealth tax
combined with a 40% wage tax. 32 T has $60 to spend currently on consumption or to save for the following period. If
he spends the $60 currently, there is no wealth tax burden. If
he saves it, he pays a wealth tax of $2.18, leaving $57.82 after
taxes. After earning interest of $5.78, T has savings of
31 A tax can be stated on either a tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive basis. Income taxes
generally are stated on a tax-inclusive basis (that is, the tax base includes the funds used to
pay the tax). Sales taxes generally are stated on a tax-exclusive basis (the tax base excludes
the funds used to pay the tax). For convenience, the consumption tax in the example is
stated on a tax-inclusive basis. The equivalent tax-exclusive rate would be 67%. The taxexclusive rate Tex can be stated in terms of the tax-inclusive rate T;,c according to the following formula :

We state the wealth tax on a tax-inclusive basis.
32 3.64% = .10/(1 + .10) X .40.
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$63.60, only 6% more than he could have consumed in the
first period. His return from savings has been reduced 40 %
by the wealth tax, just as with the 40% income tax.
Wealth Tax With Higher Interest Rate: Assume the same facts
as above, except that the pretax yield increases to 20%. If T
saves $60, he owes the same $2.18 in taxes. His $57.82 in
savings earns interest of $11.56, leaving him with $69.38 after
tax , 16% more than he could have consumed in the first period. Both the pretax return and the after-tax return rise by
the same 10 percentage points.

The conclusion that a consumption tax does not impose a burden on
savings depends on the assumption that the tax is not progressive. If
the tax is progressive, the tax generally can be decreased by smoothing consumption over the taxpayer's lifetime. Correspondingly, the
tax would tend to increase as consumption was lumped into fewer
periods. 33
The discussion above assumes idealized versions of the taxes. An
actual tax will not behave as described for several reasons. For example, actual income taxes depend heavily on the realization doctrine
and usually have preferential rates for capital gains. Thus, the effective rate on savings may be far lower than the statutory rate. Moreover, the effective rate of tax generally differs depending on the form
of the investment, the holding period, and other factors. Consumption and wealth taxes are generally not dependent on the realization
doctrine. Actual tax systems are also likely to exempt certain forms of
capital or expenditure. A wealth tax will have varying difficulty in
valuing various types of investments, which is likely to lead to different effective rates on different investments.
The first row of Table 1 summarizes the results for the real risk-free
return.

33 A progressive consumption tax can have the characteristic that it does not burden
investment if the tax provides an appropriate averaging mechanism. Further conditions
are required for this conclusion. One is that tax rates remain constant over time. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies
306-08 (3d ed., 1995) (discussing conditions under which expensing is equivalent to exemption of income from capital) . Moreover, the conclusion that a consumption tax does not
burden capital does not apply to inframarginal returns, as discussed below.
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COMPARISON OF VARIOUS TAXES ON CAPITAL

Type of return to capital

Ideal indexed income tax

Unindexed income tax
without loss offset

Consumption tax

Wealth tax

s;

Taxed at statutory rate subject to equalization , capital
gains, etc.

No tax (tax offset by the
value of expensing)

Lump sum tax ; can be
viewed as equiva lent to
inco me tax at a rate of T w x
(1 + r)!r

r

Taxed, but can offset tax by
increasing pretax risk

Potentially heavily taxed due
to Jack of loss offsets

No tax burd en

Not taxed

:::0

Excess inframarginal returns

Taxed (by assumption, cannot gross up)

Taxed (often lightly due to
deferral and capital gains)

Taxed (cannot invest tax
savings at inframargin al rate)

Not taxed

-<

Inflationary return

Not taxed (indexed basis)

Taxed at statutory rate
(unindexed basis)

No tax (basis equals zero)

Not taxed

Evenness of taxation of
different forms of capital

Even

Uneven; problems with
depreciation, inflation, realization, capital gains

Generally more even; not
worried about depreciation ,
realization, etc.

Gen erally even, but can be
serious valuation probl ems

Normal real risk-free
return (r)

Taxed at statutory rate

Risk premium

><

~

tTl

<

tTl

?0

-
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VJ
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Return to Risk Bearing
An Income Tax

Matters become more complicated when returns to risk are considered. Consider first an income tax with full loss offsets. Assuming no
response to the tax, an income tax burdens risk premia and reduces
the variance of risky outcomes. 34 Since the tax reduces risk, however,
a rational taxpayer can respond to the income tax by shifting investments from safe to risky assets without increasing the risk of his portfolio beyond that originally desired. Such a shift can fully offset the
tax on the risk premium. Thus, if taxpayers respond optimally to the
income tax, the effect of an income tax is to tax only the risk-free rate
and neither to tax the risk premium nor reduce the after-tax riskiness
of the portfolio.35
Example 4: Assume that in addition to a safe investment
yielding 10%, there is a risky investment that has an expected yield of 20%. In particular, an investment of $100 has
an equal likelihood of yielding either $50 or $190.36
Pretax Position: Assume further that prior to the imposition
of the tax, T chose to save $100 and invest one-half of his
portfolio in the safe asset and one-half in the risky asset. 37
Thus, if Tis lucky, T has income of $50 and total assets of
$150. 38 If T is unlucky, T has a loss of $20 and his assets
decrease to $80. 39 Ts expected return is $15 for an expected
rate of return of 15%. 40
34 The classic discussion of risk bearing under an income tax is Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-taking, 38 Q.J. Econ. 388 (1944).
For a modern treatment, see Atkinson & Stiglitz, note 25, at 97-127.
35 For explications of this point, see Noel B. Cunningham, 52 Tax L. R ev. 17, 29-40
(1996); Warren, Capital Income, note 28, at 4-13. The pretax level of risk can be maintained by increasing the proportion of risky assets by a factor of 11(1 - T), where Tis the tax
rate . Although the effect of the income tax on the risk premium and on the net level of
risk can be fully offset by increasing the proportion of risky assets, the taxpayer may
choose to accept a lower or higher level of risk. In particular, the income tax has a wealth
effect that may lead to a greater or lesser desired level of after-tax risk. An income tax
decreases (increases) the level of risk taken by the individual depending on whether the
wealth elasticity of demand for the risky asset is positive (negative). See Atkinson & Stiglitz, note 25, at 106.
36 The return is either a negative 50% or a positive 90%. The expected payoff is $120
for a 20% return.
37 In theory, the amount that T chooses to invest in the risky asset depends on the relative returns of the safe and risky assets and Ts tolerance for risk.
38 $150 = (.5)($100)(1 + .10) + (.5)($100)(1 + .90).
39 $80 = (.5)($100)(1 + .10) + (.5)($100)(1 - .50).
40 $15 = (.5)($50) + (.5)(-$20).
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Income TtiX Without Po rtfolio Adjustment: Assume a 40 cYo
income tax. If Tis lucky, he has pretax income of $50, pays a
tax of $20, and has after-tax income of $30. If Tis unlucky,
he has a pretax loss of $20, receives a tax refund (or a reduction of tax against other earnings) of $8 and has an after-tax
loss of $12. T's expected after-tax return is $9 for an expected rate of return of 9%. T's pretax expected rate of return is reduced 40% (from 15% to 9%) by the 40% income
tax.
Income Tax With Portfolio Adjustment: Assume T adjusts his
portfolio in response to the income tax, increasing his risky
investment to $83.33 and decreasing his safe investment to
$16.67. If Tis lucky, he has pretax income of $76.67, pays a
tax of $30.67, and has after-tax income of $46. If T is unlucky, he has a pretax loss of $40, receives a tax refund of
$16, and has an after-tax loss of $24. T's expected after-tax
return is $11, for an expected rate of return of 11%. Relative
to his pretax position, T's expected return is reduced by 4
percentage points, which is equal to the tax rate of 40% multiplied by the 10% safe return.

The result in Example 4 depends on certain key assumptions. First,
the income tax must be proportional. Second, the tax must permit
losses to be fully offset against other income and provide for refunds if
taxable income is less than zero. 41 By contrast, the current income tax
is progressive and imposes severe restrictions on losses. 42 Thus, the
current income tax can impose a severe penalty on risky investments.
In addition, the necessary portfolio adjustment to offset the risk effects of the income tax may require borrowing or increasing the level
of borrowing. Thus, the argument depends on taxpayers being able to
borrow freely at the ·risk-free rate. 43
41 The requirement of full loss offsets can be thought of as an extension of the proportionality requirement to the negative income range.
42 Losses are limited by both taxable income and the capital loss limitation. IRC §§ 1,
1211. In both cases, the loss may be eligible to be carried over to other years (with deferral
if carried forward). IRC §§ 170, 1211. Even if allowed, losses may be less valuable due to
the progressive tax structure, which tends to overtax gains relative to losses, particularly in
the absence of income averaging. IRC § 1 (progressive rate structure). Compare IRC
§§ 1301-1305 (repealed) (income averaging for all taxpayers) , with IRC § 1301 (income
averaging for farmers). The realization requirement and reduced rates for capital gains
mutes the effect of the income tax on risk. IRC § 1(h). In addition to IRC § 1211 , there
are many other provisions that restrict losses. See, e.g., IRC § 469 (passive loss
limitations).
43 Cunningham, note 35, at 37-39.
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/1 Consumption Tax

A. consumption tax generally imposes no burden on either a riskfree return or a risky return. The analysis parallels the anal ysis for the
risk-free return: \-Vhether the return is risk-free or risky, the tax saved
by deferring consumption exactly pays for the tax later due on the
deferred consumption so long as the deferred tax is invested with the
same return as the deferred consumption. 4 4

Example 5: As in Example 4, there is a risky investment with
an equal likelihood of returning either negative 50% or positive 90%. The expected return on the investment is 20%.
Assume a 40% tax-inclusive consumption tax. T has $100
that he can either spend currently or save and spend in the
next period. If T chooses to consume this period , T could
consume $60, paying a tax of $40.
If T chooses to save and invests in the risky asset, he has
either $50 or $190 available for consumption (and payment
of taxes). If he is lucky, he could consume $114 (paying tax
of $76). If he is unlucky, he could consume $30 (paying tax
of $20). His expected consumption, therefore, is $72. 4 5
Thus, his expected return is 20%, unreduced by the tax.

As in the case of the income tax, the no-burden result relies on
proportional rates. Unlike the income tax, the assumption of loss offsets is unnecessary because consumption is always positive. 46
m.

A Wealth Tax

A wealth tax imposes no burden on risky investments beyond that
imposed on safe investments. Thus, while a wealth tax discourages
savings, it does not distort the decision as between safe and risky investments. The argument is simple and follows directly from the lump
sum nature of the tax. Consider a taxpayer who has a pool of wealth
W. She can invest the wealth in either a safe or risky asset. In either
44 The algebraic proof is essentially the same as in the risk-free case. See note 29. Tis
considering spending one dollar on consumption currently or in one year. There is a consumption tax at the rate Tc. If spent now, T pays a tax of Tc and consumes (1 - Tc)· If saved
for one year, the amount available for spending increases to (1 + z), where z is a random
variable representing the risky return. If the savings then are spent in full, the is be (1 +
z)Tc and the amount left for consumption is (1 + z)(1 - Tc)· The amount available for
consumption, after tax, increases by exactly the ex post rate of return. Thus, there is no tax
burden on savings.
45 $72 ::: (.5)($114) + (.5)($30).
46 While consumption is always positive, it may be less than an exemption amount,
which may have the effect of discouraging risktaking.
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case, however, she will have an identical tax liability, T ,.. x \IV. Thus,
the tax is a fixed cost and does not distort her decision:n :Moreover,
since the amount of the wealth tax is independent of the outcome of a
risky investment, there is no reduction in risk and no incentive or opportunity to shift into the risky asse t without increasing the overall
level of risk. Since an ex post wealth tax is equivalent to an ex ante
wealth tax, an ex post wealth tax also imposes no burden on risky
investments beyond that imposed on safe investments.
The effect of the various taxes on risky investments is summarized
in the second row of Table 1. 4 8

Inframarginal Returns

c.

The analysis above assumed that the investor could freely adjust the
amount of his investment in different assets without changing the rate
of return on the assets; in other words, that all investments were marginal investments. The assumption of marginal investments is quite
reasonable for most investors most of the time. For example , if an
individual is considering an investment in a bank deposit, a mutual
fund, a publicly traded stock, or publicly traded bonds, the individual
generally can invest as much as she likes without having a measurable
effect on the rate of return on the investment. On the other hand,
there are other investment opportunities where it is reasonable to assume that an above-market return is available on a limited basis. For
example, an individual may be aware of a unique business opportunity
requiring a relatively fixed amount of capital. 49 Individuals are assumed to fully invest in an inframarginal investment until, on the margin, it has become a marginal investment. How common
inframarginal returns are is an empirical question. 50
The analysis of income and consumption taxes changes once inframarginal returns are taken into account. The analysis of the wealth
tax, however, remains unchanged. As explained below, both income
More precisely, there is no substitution effect, although there may be a wealth effect.
See page 516.
49 We suspect that many such unique opportunities are better viewed as returns to labor
than returns to capital. For example, William Gentry and Glenn Hubbard suggest that
inframarginal returns are associated with "rents to ideas, managerial skill, or market
power. " William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, 11 Tax Pol'y and the Economy 1, 6 (1997). The first
two categories that Gentry and Hubbard list are returns to human capital, not inanimate
capital.
so See, e.g., id. at 22-24 (attempting to look at the distribution of inframarginal returns
by comparing the value of q, the ratio of the market value of an asset, to its replacement
cost for households, at diffe rent incom e levels).
47

48
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and consumption taxes generally burden inframarginal returns. A
wealth tax generally leaves inframarginal returns untaxed.

L

An I nco m e Tax

As an initial matter, an income tax captures a fixed percentage of
any return, whether marginal or inframarginal. In the case of risky
returns, taxation of the risk premium can be avoided effectively by
shifting investment from the safe asset to the risky asset. By assumption , however, a taxpayer already has chosen to invest the maximum
amount in inframarginal investments. 51 Therefore, there are no further opportunities to shift investments from marginal to inframarginal
investments. Thus, the inframarginal investment bears the full burden
of the tax.
n.

A Consumption Tax

A consumption tax does not burden investment (either risk-free or
risky) because the tax savings from deferring consumption grows at
the same rate as the deferred consumption. Thus, the consumption
tax does not burden savings so long as there is an opportunity to invest the deferred tax liability at the same rate as the deferred consumption. With an inframarginal investment, the taxpayer already has
chosen to invest the maximum amount in the inframarginal investment. Thus, the tax savings can be invested only at the lesser marginal
rate. As a result, the tax savings is insufficient to fund the tax due on
the deferred consumption and part of the return from the inframarginal investment must be used to pay the tax. 52
51 Even if the taxpayer wishes to consume currently and not save, she can invest in th e
inframarginal investment by borrowing.
52 Assume that marginal investments earn at a rate r and that there is a single inframarginal investment available that earns at a rate g > r. Assume further that the most
that can be invested in the inframarginal investment isS x (1- Tc). Consider, as in note 29,
an individual who has S to invest. He can spend either S x (1 - Tc) currently (paying S x Tc
in taxes) or save S. If he saves S, however, the most he can invest in the inframarginal
investment is S x (1 - Tc)· The remaining S x Tc must be invested in the marginal investment. Thus, after one period, he has:
(1 + g)S X (1 - Zc) + (1 + r)S X Zc.
The expression can be rewritten as:
[(1 + r)S X (1 - Zc) + (1 + r)S X Zc)] + (g - r)S X (1 - Zc)·
The terms in the brackets are the marginal returns on the saved consumption and the saved
taxes. As before, the marginal return on the deferred taxes is just sufficient to pay the tax
on the marginal return on the deferred consumption. The term after the bracket is the
excess inframarginal return on the deferred consumption. By assumption, there is no excess return on deferred taxes. As a result, part of the excess return on the deferred consumption must be used to pay taxes. In particular, the excess rate of return would be
reduced by a factor of 1 - Tc.
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Example 6: Assume that there is a 40% tax-inclusive consumption tax. T has a unique opportunity to invest up to $60
with a yield of 25%. A ny further savings yield only the market rate of 10%. T decides to defer $60 of consumption , investing the $60 in the unique investment. His decision to
defer his consumption frees up $40 that otherwise would be
due in current taxes. He invests the $40 in saved taxes at the
market rate.
T earns $15 on the $60 inframarginal investment and $4 on
the $40 marginal investment. Thus, at the end of the period,
he has $119. 53 With $119, he can consume $71.40 and pay
taxes of $47.60. 54 By saving, he increases his consumption by
only $11.40 (19% ), rather than $15 (25% ). Thus, the consumption tax burdens his excess inframarginal return. 55

ttL.

A Wealth Tax

Unlike the consumption or income tax, the wealth tax does not tax
excess inframarginal returns. The argument is simple and again follows from the lump sum nature of the wealth tax. An ex ante wealth
tax imposes the same burden whatever the return from the investment. Thus, if a taxpayer has an opportunity to invest in an inframarginal project, his tax liability from the project is exactly the
same as it would be if he invested in a marginal project. No additional
liability is generated by the excess return from the inframarginal
investment.
Another way to see that an ex ante wealth tax imposes no burden
on the excess return is to consider an inframarginal investment funded
entirely by debt. Assuming perfect debt markets, the interest cost on
the debt equals the marginal yield. Thus, the net income from the
project equals the excess return from the project. Since, however, the
project is entirely debt-funded, the net worth of the project is zero and
no tax is due. Thus, it is clear that there is no tax burden on the excess
return.
One could argue that the analysis above is incorrect. In particular,
the net worth of a fully debt-funded inframarginal project is positive,
not zero. Its value is the present value of the excess return. The opportunity to invest in an inframarginal project is an intangible asset
$119 = ($60 X 1.25) + (40 X 1.10).
$47.60 = 40% X $119.
55 The inframarginal investment returns 25%, while the marginal investment returns
only 10% . His excess return is, therefore , 15 % or $9. A 40 % tax on $9 is $3.60, which is
precisely the amount by which the tax has reduced hi s earnings. See note 52.
53

54
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with positive value. A perfect wealth tax would tax such an intangible
asset in the same manner as any other asset. The argument is that
there are no inframarginal returns, only intangible assets that are not
valued properly and taxed. No practical wealth tax, however, could
include such intangible assets in its base. Thus, as a practical matter, if
not a theoretical matter, the argument that a wealth tax will not tax
inframarginal returns is correct.
The argument, so far, is based on an ex ante and not an ex post
wealth tax. As shown above, a single period ex post wealth tax is not
equivalent to a single period ex ante wealth tax with respect to inframarginal returns. 56 An ex post wealth tax includes excess inframarginal returns in the tax base. The difference between the ex
ante and ex post wealth tax disappears, however, where the tax is periodic. With a periodic tax the excess inframarginal return, not taxed in
the period in which it is earned, enters the tax base for future periods.
If the excess inframarginal return is consumed in the period earned, it
escapes the wealth tax entirely. In this regard, the treatment of excess
inframarginal returns is identical to the treatment of wages.
The treatment of inframarginal returns by the various taxes is summarized in the third row of Table 1. 57
d.

Inflation

Properly speaking, inflation is not a return to capital. Many taxes,
however, fail to distinguish between real and inflationary increases in
value and , in effect, treat inflation as part of an asset's yield. Absent
proper adjustments, an income tax treats inflation as a taxable return.
Generally, inflation is not a problem for either a consumption tax or a
wealth tax. 58
See Subsection II.B.l.
See page 516.
58 The discussion in the text concerns mismeasurement of the tax base due to inflation.
Inflation also causes structural problems for many taxes. In particular, whenever the computation of tax liability is based on a fixed number of dollars, real tax liabilities vary with
inflation. For example, inflation causes the value of personal exemptions and the size of
tax brackets to shrink in real terms. The problem, often referred to as "bracket creep," is
easily solved by indexing the brackets and other fixed dollar amounts. The Code is mostly,
but not entirely, indexed to protect against bracket creep. Compare IRC § l(f) ("official"
tax brackets fully indexed), with IRC § 15l(d) (tax bracket caused by phaseout of personal
exemptions incompletely indexed). To the extent that a consumption or wealth tax had
brackets, exemptions, credits, or similar fixed dollar amounts , indexing of such amounts
would be necessary. See generally Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 Tax L. Rev.
537 (1993).
Inflation also causes problems if there are delays between measurement of the tax base
and payment of taxes. Such pro blems are relatively unimportant and relatively easy to
control for so long as the rate of inflation is low or mod erate.
56
57
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An Income Tax

L.

The computation of income from capital, whether in the form of
gain or loss, or in the form of periodic returns or deductions, generally
can be made only by reference to dollar amounts from prior periods.
Unless those dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation, the computation of income contains an amount that represents the effect of inflation. While it is possible to adjust the computation of income to
compensate for inflation ("indexing"), doing so is complex. Due in
part to that complexity, the Code has never indexed income. Many
provisions of the Code, such as preferential rates for capital gains 59
and accelerated depreciation 60 have been justified, at least in part, as
ad hoc corrections for inflation.

Example 7: T purchases a share of stock for $100, selling it
one year later for $110. In the intervening year, there has
been 6% inflation. Under an unindexed income tax, T has
$10 income, the difference between the amount received on
sale and the purchase price. Stated in current dollars, however, Ts investment in the property, is not $100, but $106. In
other words, in terms of Ts ability to purchase goods and
services, T needs $106 dollars today to be as well off as he
was if he spent the $100 one year ago. Ts real income is only
$4, the difference between the amount realized on sale and
the adjusted purchase price. The income tax could be indexed by increasing Ts basis in the property to $106 to reflect the intervening inflation.

n.

A Consumption Tax

Generally, a consumption tax does not need to be indexed for inflation because the tax base is determined only by reference to current
dollars. For example, a sales tax is imposed on the current sales price.
With a cash flow type tax, the tax base is current receipts minus the
amount currently saved. In either case, there is no need to resort to
concepts such as basis measured in dollars from a prior period.

Example 8: As in Example 7, T purchases a share of stock
for $100 and sells it after one year for $110. T immediately
uses the proceeds from the sale for consumption. Assume
that there has been intervening inflation of 6%. In the first
year, T would be permitted to deduct the $100 purchase. No
59

60

See, e.g., IRC § l(h).
See, e.g., IRC § 168.
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adjustment is needed for inflation because the purchase is
current. In the second year, T would include the $110 of
consumption. Again, no adjustment is needed for inflation
because the sale is current. While the effect of inflation
would increase his tax liability in nominal terms by 6%, his
real liability would be unaffected by inflation because he
would be able to pay the tax in inflated dollars.

tn.

A Wealth Tax

Generally, as with a consumption tax, a wealth tax does not need to
be indexed for inflation because the tax base is determined only by
reference to current dollars. The only information that generally is
required is the current value of assets and liabilities; no reference
need be made to historical values.
Example 9: T purchases the same share of stock as in Example 7. T would have taxable wealth of $100 in the first period, and taxable wealth of $110 in the second period. As a
result of inflation, his nominal tax liability would be 6%
higher in the second period. His real liability would be unaffected by inflation because he would pay the tax in inflated
dollars.

The treatment of inflationary returns by the various taxes is summarized in the fourth row of Table 1. 61
e.

Summary

The pure form of all income, consumption, and wealth taxes, burden capital. There are, however, significant differences in how each
taxes capital. An income tax taxes risk-free and inframarginal returns,
but generally does not tax returns to risk. An income tax also may
encourage greater risktaking as taxpayers act to offset the tax. A consumption tax burdens neither the risk-free return nor returns to risk,
but, as with the income tax, taxes inframarginal returns. Finally, a
wealth tax imposes a lump sum tax on capital that can be viewed as a
tax on the risk-free rate of return, but imposes no burden on either
risky or inframarginal returns. Thus, if it is believed important to tax
inframarginal returns, the wealth tax is a relatively unattractive form
of taxation.
61

See page 516.
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The pure form s of the various taxes are likely to be neither politically nor adminstratively feasible. Thus , the choice between the taxes
will depend on the compromises that must be made in order to enact
an administrable tax. For example, the income tax is much more sensitive to inflation than is the wealth or consumption tax. Thus, if infla tion is a problem, wealth and consumption taxes m ay be relatively
more attractive than income taxes.
4.

A.dminist rability

A wealth tax has both obvious administrative problems and o bvious
advantages. The primary administrative difficulty is that a wealth tax
requires that assets be valued on an annual basis. While many valuation problems could be solved, there is no question that substantial
problems would remain. One useful way to consider t he significance
of the valuation problem is to examine the percentage of all assets
that are easy or hard to value. To get a feel for this issue, we use
figures from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts , which attempt to identify all assets in the economy. 6 2
Table 2 divides up assets held by individuals into categories that
seem easy, medium, or hard to value. Table 3 looks more specifically
at the assets that are likely to be included in a wealth tax. We treat
assets as easy to value if different people valuing those assets generally would reach more or less the same number in making the valuation. For example, shares traded on a stock exchange are easy to
value. This is a reasonable conclusion, although valuing a large block
of such stock occasionally might raise issues that would make that particular block more difficult to value. We treat assets as of medium
difficulty to value if we generally would expect different people valuing those assets to reach roughly the same number, although we would
not expect the numbers to be exactly the same. We treat an asset as
hard to value if we would not be surprised that two people making a
valuation of the asset came up with numbers that were significantly
different. In making these evaluations, we take into account the
amount one reasonably might expect to spend valuing an asset given
the value of the asset.
Although we have no data on the valuation of consumer durables,
we expect they generally are difficult to value, given the likely costs of
valuation compared to value. Any reasonable wealth tax is likely to
exempt consumer durables below a threshold. 63 For purposes of this
62 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Guide to Flow of F unds Accounts (1993) [hereinafter Flow of Funds).
63 See Subsection III.D . for a fuller discussion of the trea tment of consumer durables.

2000]

527

A COMPREHENSIVE WEALTH TAX
TABLE

AssET

T oTALS

FRoM FLow oF

2
FuNDS

Acco uNTs-1994

$billions
Tangibl e asse ts
Own er-occupied hou sing
Co nsumer durable goods
Total Financial Assets
Deposits
Foreign deposi ts
Checkable deposits and currency
Time and savings deposits
Money market fund shares
Credit market instruments
Open market paper
U.S. government securities
Treasury
Savings bonds
Other Trea sury
Agency
Municipal securities
Corporate and foreign bonds
Mortgages
Corporate equities
Mutual fund shares
Security credit
Life insurance reserves
Pension fund reserves
Investment in bank personal trusts
Equity in noncorporate business*
Miscellaneous assets
Total Assets

Percen t of
Total Assets

9,500
7,282
2,218
19,169
3,157
19

564
2,224
351
1,930
47
913
782
180
602

131
502
353
116
3,071
1,052
109
520
4,948
699
3,405
277
28,669

33.1
25.4
7.7
66.9
11.0
0.1
2.0
7.8

1.2
6.7
0.2
3.2
2.7
0.6
2.1
0.5

1.7
1.2
0.4
10.7
3.7
0.4

1.8
17.3
2.4
11.9

1.0
100.0

* Includes direct investment in real estate other th an owner-occupied housing
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal R eserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of
the United States, 1991-1999 (Mar. 10, 2000), tbl. B.lOO (Balance Sheet of Households and
Nonprofit Organizations) , available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/releases/zl/Current/
data.htm> (visited May 23, 2000).

analysis, we include one-half of consumer durables and rate consumer
durables as being of medium difficulty.
Deposits generally are recorded at their current value and should
be easy to value. There are markets for most U.S. government and
municipal securities, and that should make them easy to value. There
is trading in many corporate and foreign bonds. It should be easy to
determine the value of a debt instrument rated by credit agencies.
Although we do not have data on the extent of bonds that do not fit
these criteria, we do not believe it is very great.
It is possible to make tentative valuations of mortgages based on
the projected cash flow of the instrument. It would be improvident ,
however, to value the mortgage without some determination of the
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3

AssETS LIKELY TO BE TAXED UNDER A WEALTH TAx

Amount
included
in base
($billions)
Consume r durable goods
Foreign deposits
Checkable deposits and currency
Time and savings deposi ts
Money market fund shares
Open market paper
Savings bonds
Other treasury
Agency
Municipal securities
Corporate and foreign bonds
Mortgages
Corporate equities
Mutual fund shares
Security credit
Life insurance reserves
Investment in bank personal trusts
Equity in noncorporate business*
Total

Percent
of Base

1,109
19
564
2,224
351
47
180
602
131
502
353
116
3,071
1,052
109
520
699
3,405

7.4
0.1
3.7
14.8
2.3
0.3
1.2
4.0
0.9
3.3
2.3
0.8
20.4
7.0
0.7
3.5
4.6
22.6

15,053

100.0

Difficulty of Valua tion
Easy

Medium

Hard

7.4
0.1
3.7
14.8
2.3
0.3
1.2
4.0
0.9
3.3
2.3
17.7
7.0

0.8
2.7
0.7

3.5
4.6
65.9

15 .1

7.5

26.6

7.5

* Includes direct investment in real estate other than owner-occupied housing

value of the underlying property, and, in some cases, the creditworthiness of the debtor. We have classified mortgages therefore as of medium difficulty in valuing.
In the case of corporate equities, publicly traded stock accounts for
about 87% of the current market value of shares outstanding. 64 Accordingly, 87% of the category is easy to value. We believe that the
remainder of this category should present medium valuation difficulties. The valuation of such interests is a fairly common necessity
under the estate tax and the Service has set guidelines that should be
used in that process. 65 While there certainly are situations where the
valuation process sparks significant controversy, we think that, on the
whole, guidelines such as those set out by the Service in the past
would put the valuations made into a reasonably narrow band.
Mutual fund shares are issued by one of two types of funds. Openend funds generally have net asset values determined on a daily basis.

64

Estimate of the Flow of Funds Section of the staff of the Federal Reserve Board.
Telephone conversation with AI Teplin of that staff, May 17, 2000.
65 R ev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, amplified in Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170.
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Most closed-end funds are traded on an exchange and have quoted
prices for their values. 66 Accordingly, these should be easy to value.
Valuation of security credit is similar to the valuation of mortgages,
except that the determinative issue is usually the creditworthiness of
the debtor. We classify them of moderate difficulty to value. Trustees
of bank personal trusts could be required to report the value of such
trusts to the beneficiaries, which should make them easy to value.
There is a wide range of assets in noncorporate businesses (partnerships and other unincorporated businesses), few of which are easy to
value. 67 We tentatively have characterized two-thirds of noncorporate
business assets as moderately difficult to value and one-third as hard
to value.
Given our division of the assets into the three categories, we estimate that 66% of assets would be easy to value and 7.5% of assets
would be hard to value.6s
One helpful aspect of the wealth tax is that the rate of tax on net
worth is relatively low, 1.57% in our base case. This means that, while
valuation problems might exist, they might not create the practical
problems that at first might appear to arise. For example, a disagreement about the value of stock in the range of a $20,000 difference
between the taxpayer and the administrator translates into an argument over $314 of tax when the tax is 1.57%. Thus, one can speculate
that, as long as the tax administrators do not take too idiosyncratic a
view of valuation, relatively few disagreements over value would be
worth taking beyond an administrative level. 69
The fact that the wealth tax is structured with a single rate has clear
administrative advantages. One of the thorny issues in a progressive
income tax is to whom to attribute any given item of income. Progressive consumption and wealth taxes raise similar issues. A single tax
rate substantially lessens such issues because the amount of tax to be
collected generally is unaffected by the identity of the taxpayer.
66 Richard B. Stephens, Guy B. Maxfield, Stephen A. Lind & Dennis A. Calfee, Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation ~ 4.02[3][d] (7th ed., 1997).
67 Although noncorporate businesses have some easy-to-value assets such as bank deposits and traded securities, their main assets are trade receivables, equipment and
software, inventories, and real estate. See Flow of Funds, note 62, tbl. B.l02. Trade receivables are monetized in commercial markets and can be valued with some accuracy. Studies
suggest that real estate can be appraised with errors that vary from 3% to 10% of value,
depending partly on the skill of the appraiser and partly on the type of real estate involved
(residential, raw land, and the like). See Richard A. Graff & MichaelS. Young, The Magnitude of Random Appraisal Error in Commercial Real Estate Valuation, 17 J. Real Est.
Res. 33 (1999), which includes a summary of prior research in the area.
68 See Table 3 on page 528.
69 The statement in the text ignores the effect of a current valuation on future valuations. To the extent that a current valuation was precedent for the future, the stakes could
be considerably higher.
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Unfortunately, even if there is only one nonzero rate , there is also
an implicit or explicit zero rate in any realistic tax system. Those
under the exemption level, and perhaps foreign persons and exempt
entities face the zero rate.7° Thus, for example, there is an incentive
to vest ownership (or taxpaying status) in a person who has an unused
exemption amount. As long as the exemption amounts are modest,
however, taxpayers generally ·.vould not find major tax planning initiatives worthwhile. Moreover, it is always possible to reduce exemptions for dependents to reduce the opportunity to shift wealth.7 1
The use of a single rate also potentially offers significant advantages
for collection of the tax. When the tax rate is independent of the
owner of an asset, any holder of the asset can be made liable for the
wealth tax without regard to the true beneficial owner. For example,
if one wished to include the value of defined benefit retirement accounts in the wealth tax base, it would be possible to impose the tax
on the retirement plan rather than the individual beneficiaries whose
interests in the plan may be quite contingent. Of course, by doing so,
we potentially tax individuals who might be entitled to an exemption.
Thus, care must be exercised in choosing when to impose tax at other
than the taxpayer level. The problem of the exemption could be dealt
with by treating the tax as a withholding tax and imputing the assets
and the tax payment to the beneficiaries. Treating the entity level tax
as a mere withholding tax, however, might significantly reduce the administrative advantage of imposing the tax at the entity level.
Even where the identity of an owner and the value of his interest is
clear, it may be advantageous to collect the tax at source. Thus, for
example, banks could pay the tax with respect to deposits. Whether
such a system would be politically feasible is, of course, another
question.
Corporations probably raise the most serious collection and valuation issues. We assume that, at the very least, corporations would continue to be used as tax collection vehicles. Thus, the tax on some
portion of a corporation's value would be collected at the corporate
level. The tax could be collected on the value of the equity in the
corporation or on all value, including value owned by debtholders. A
second issue is how the value of the corporation would be determined.
One possibility would be to value all assets and liabilities of the corpo70 We have not made any serious attempt so far to deal with foreign persons or exempt
entities. The failure to do so does not represent a belief that such questions are unimportant. To the contrary, we believe that they must be dealt with in any realistic proposal.
71 In the context of the income tax, shifting to dependents is limited by, among other
provisions, the elimination of exemptions for dependents, IRC § 151( d) , limitations on
standard deductions for depend ents, § 63(c), and the "kiddie tax, " IRC § 1(g). Of the
three provisions, only the kiddie tax responds to shifting du e to progressive rates.
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ration. Another way would be to value all interests in the corporation.72 It seems likely that valuing the interests in publicly traded
corporations would prove to be administratively superior to valuing
the assets. It is likely that the decision would go the other way fo r
privately held corporations.
It is worth noting that there would be collateral effects to the decision as to how to value the corporation. For example, imagine a corporation that had substantial contingent tort liabilities. It is likely that
it would be impossible (and probably undesirable) to tax the tort victims on their contingent claims. It might be seen, therefore, as desirable to deny the tortfeasor a deduction. If the corporation were valued
as the sum of its assets and liabilities, it would be possible to treat
certain liabilities as nondeductible. If, however, the corporation were
valued by reference to the value of its shares, the contingent liability
implicitly would be deductible. 73
We also need to determine whether the wealth tax paid by the corporation is a final tax or a mere withholding tax. Given the flat tax
rate, we think it would be sensible to treat the tax as a final tax, which
also would have the effect of taxing foreign persons and exempt organizations on their stock ownership.
The wealth tax described here is unlike the current estate and gift
tax, and indeed, we do not consider whether the estate and gift tax
should be preserved in a world in which a wealth tax replaces the income tax. Given the different purposes of the two taxes, there is no
necessary relationship between the enactment of a wealth tax and the
repeal of the estate and gift tax. Moreover, since the bases of the
wealth tax and the estate and gift tax are similar, enactment of the
wealth tax would make enforcement of the estate and gift tax much
easier. Certain classes of transactions that people engage in to avoid
the estate and gift tax generally are not relevant to a wealth tax since
the transfer of assets from one person to another would not affect the
application of a uniformly applied wealth tax (except to the extent the
transferee is an untaxed individual (such as a foreigner) or is protected from tax by credits).

72 For articles discussing the possibility of using the market value of corporations to
determine the corporate income for purposes of the corporate income tax, see Joseph
Bankman, A Market Value Based Corporate Income Tax, 68 Tax Notes 1347, 1348-49
(Sept. 11, 1995); MichaelS. Knoll, An Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1,
4-16 (1996).
73 Of course, it would be possible to add certain liabilities back into the value of the
corporation. Doing so, however, would substantially complicate administration.
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THE WEALTH TAX BASE

A major issue in designing a wealth tax is the definition of wealth.
The following Subsections discuss possible components of taxable
wealth that we considered separately.
A.

Financial Holdings

There is little question that financial holdings would be a core part
of the base of a wealth tax. This category includes investment securities and bank accounts. Financial holdings are likely to be the easiest
category of assets to subject to a wealth tax.7 4
B.

Businesses

We would expect that those who own businesses would be taxed on
their value although the treatment of business owners raises a number
of problems. First, small businesses are likely to be some of the most
difficult assets to value. Second, as discussed below, small businesses
raise some of the thorniest questions in determining whether income
is from labor (which would be taxed under our wage tax) or capital
(which would be exempt).
An obvious question is whether there should be any special rules
for small businesses. Two separate arguments justify special treatment
of small businesses. First, as an administrative matter, it may be difficult and inefficient to include the assets of very small businesses, particularly where the assets may be hard to distinguish from what may
be excluded personal assets. Second, it may be viewed as desirable to
subsidize small businesses by imposing a reduced tax on them. For
example, the current income tax permits small businesses to expense
up to $20,000 in equipment purchases per year.7 5 By analogy, it would
be possible to exempt a specified amount of new equipment purchases
from the wealth tax. Special valuation rules also could be employed
to reduce either the administrative or tax burden on small businesses.
For purposes of our estimations, we assume that there are no special
rules for small businesses.
C.

Other Inv estment Assets

Real estate investments and other nonsecurity investments (such as
collectibles-the proverbial Rembrandts in the vault) presumably also
would be subject to tax. As the investment becomes less fungible, valWe assume that municipal bonds would be included as taxable financial assets.
IRC § 179. The figure in the text is for 2000. The § 179 limit is scheduled to increase
in stages until it reaches $25,000 in 2003.
74
75
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uation questions arise of the type previously discussed in connection
with the administrability of a wealth tax system. 76
D.

Consumer Durables

When the Rembrandt is moved into the parlor, the question of taxing it becomes more complicated. It is not feasible to tax the value of
every asset owned by individuals. We hope to avoid many of the practical aspects of this issue by including some general exemptions in the
structure of the tax. 77 We do not favor, however, a blanket exemption
for consumer durables. Our justification for taxing some consumer
durables is two-fold. First, the line between consumer durables and
investment assets is often ambiguous. An unlimited exemption for
consumer durables would put great pressure on the difference. Second, if the picture on the parlor wall is worth $10 million, it is reasonable to tax it regardless of the owner's intention in buying it. We
imagine that a realistic wealth tax would exempt a certain amount
(maybe $10,000-$50,000) of consumer durables. We have not, however, built an explicit consumer goods exemption into our numerical
estimates because our data set, the Survey of Consumer Finances,
does not contain detailed information about each respondent's consumer goods. We believe that the consumer goods (furniture, kitchenware, and the like) that are omitted from the survey responses are
probably similar to the kind and amount that would be exempt under
an actual wealth tax. Thus, in effect, we consider an exemption for
consumer durables to be built into the data.
E.

Retirement Assets

The current income tax gives special treatment to retirement savings_78 A politically realistic wealth tax is likely to do the same. The
rationale for the favorable income tax treatment derives from the
country's retirement policy and has nothing to do with income tax policy. These same considerations are likely to dictate favorable treatment for retirement savings under a wealth tax.
Accordingly, for our base case, we assumed that assets held in qualified retirement accounts would not be subject to the net worth portion
of the wealth tax. We also assumed that amounts contributed to retirement accounts would be excluded from the wage tax and that
amounts withdrawn from retirement accounts would be taxable as
See
See
78 See
tirement
76

77

Subsection II.B.4.
text accompanying note 113.
generally IRC §§ 401-418E (qualified plans), § 219 (deduction for individual reaccount contributions).
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wages. Given the fiat rate of the wage tax, the treatment in th e base
case is essentially equivalent to denying a de ducti on for retirernent
contributions and excluding all amounts received from a retirement
account from the wage tax. 79 Differences between the two treatments
would arise if the tax rate in the year of contribution differed from
that in the year of distribution or if th e contribution limit was not
properly adjusted as between the two possible approaches.
While our base case assumes that retirement accounts would continue to be tax-free, we also tried to estimate the wealth tax assuming
a positive rate on retirement accounts. While aggregate numbers on
retirement assets are available , it is difficult to otain accurate figures
on an individual basis. With aggregate figures, it is possible to make a
reasonable estimate of the revenue that could be collected with a tax
on retirement assets, but not to distribute the tax by income or wealth
groups. Moreover, it is impossible to take into account the reduction
m revenue due to the use of tax credits that otherwise would be
unusable.
F.

Life Insurance

For term life insurance, the taxable asset generally would be the
value of paid, but unaccrued, premiums. Thus, for example, assume a
taxpayer has an annual premium of $1,000 and pays the premium on
April 1, the beginning of the policy period. As of December 31, the
approximate value of his contract would be $250, the premium for the
remaining three months of the contract. Given the relatively small
value of such contracts, we suspect it would not be worthwhile including term life insurance in the wealth tax base, particularly at the level
of the individual contract holder. In some cases, a term life policy
may be substantially more valuable. For example, term insurance
polices frequently guarantee continued insurance without the need for
subsequent medical examinations. 80 Such a right can be quite valuable for someone with declining health. Even within a single year, a
holder of insurance whose he alth has significantly declined owns a valuable asset. Any attempt to value life insurance based on the health
of the insured would likely pose serious valuation problems and be
79 The treatment in the base case is equivalent to the treatment of a traditional deductible IRA. IRC § 408. The alternative treatment is equivalent to the treatment of a Roth
IRA. IRC § 408A.
so Term policies also frequently provide for a level payment for five , ten, or twenty
years. With such policies, the price of the insurance generally is overstated for the early
periods and understated for the later periods. Thus , after the first payment or so, the
owner of the policy has a valuable right to continue to purchase insurance at a belowmark e t rate. The aggregate value of such rights is not likely to be that significant.
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poorly received by the public. It is unlikely, therefore, that we would
vvish to tax individuals in such circumstances.
If it was believed desirable to tax term life insurance contracts , it
would be much simpler to tax the contracts at the company level. 8 1
Taxing at the company level could be accomplished by denying a deduction for reserves. If the wealth tax on corporate assets were imposed at the corporate level , denying a deduction for reserves would
be straightforward. If the wealth tax on corporate assets were imposed at the shareholder level, a surrogate tax on the policyholder
could be imposed as a excise tax on the life insurance company's
reserves. In either case, we would expect the incidence of the tax to
be on the policyholders.
vVhole life policies, however, represent a significant source of
wealth. According to Table 2, life insurance reserves are $505 billion,
or 1.8% of assets. Currently, income on life insurance reserves generally is not taxed. 82 In the base case, we include the cash value of
whole life insurance. For reasons of administrability and politics, it
may be preferable to impose the tax at the life insurance company
level.
G.

Housing

The income tax gives favorable treatment to home ownership. Even
in 1986, when many sacred cows were slaughtered, the favorable treatment of home ownership emerged essentially unscathed. 83 We think
that it is unrealistic to base a wealth tax on the assumption that homes
would be taxed like other assets. The exact scope of the exemption,
however, is open to question. The two basic approaches are to exclude the gross value of housing or to exclude the value of housing net
of mortgage liabilities. Excluding the net value of housing is
equivalent to excluding both the home and the mortgage from the tax
base. 84 Within the two basic approaches, it is possible to provide for a
variety of limitations, such as a cap on excluded housing, a cap on
81 The problem of term life insurance is essentially the same as with any other prepaid
contract. Examples would include automobile and homeowner 's insurance, magazine subscriptions, and tuition.
82 IRC § 101.
83 With the possible exception of the $1 million cap on acquisition indebtedness, the
limitations on home mortgage interest imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 511, 100 Stat. 2085, 2244, and revised by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,102, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-84, probably are better seen
as attempts to prevent the home mortgage interest deduction from expanding in light of
the general disallowance of personal interest, rather than attempts to actually cut back on
the deduction. See IRC § 163(h).
84 Since the home is an asset, excluding it from the tax base reduces tax liability. Since
the mortgage is a liability, excluding it from the tax base increases tax liability.

536

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:

excluded mortgages, or a limitation on the number of qualified
residences.
For our base case, we exclude only the net value of homes and limit
the exclusion to $1 million. Thus, for example, if an individual had a
home with a fair market value of $250,000 and a mortgage of $200,000,
$50,000 of the value of the home would be excluded. This is
equivalent to excluding the home and the mortgage from the wealth
tax. If the individual had a home worth $6 million with a mortgage of
$2.4 million, she would be permitted to exclude $1 million of the net
value of the home. In other words, she would exclude the $2.4 million
mortgage and $3.4 million of the value of the home, including in her
wealth tax base only the remaining $2.6 million in net value of the
home.
Our base case represents a significant reduction in the exclusion
permitted und er current law. Under current law, taxp ayers generally
are permitted to deduct interest on home mortgages of up to $1 million85 and are permitted to exclude the entire amount of imputed income from home ownership. The equivalent treatment under a
wealth tax would be to exclude mortgages up to $1 million from the
tax base and to exclude the entire gross, not net, value of homes. If
we adopted such treatment in the wealth tax, a homeowner with a
$250,000 home and $200,000 mortgage would be able to exclude the
entire $250,000 gross value of his home and still use the $200,000
mortgage to offset other wealth. Similarly, a homeowner with a $6
million home and a $2.4 million mortgage would be permitted to exclude the entire $6 million home from the tax base while still using $1
million of the mortgage to offset other assets.
Although we have not chosen to follow the example of the income
tax, we recognize that there are both equity and efficiency arguments
in favor of excluding housing while still permitting a deduction for
home mortgages. Limiting the exclusion to net housing wealth penalizes individuals who finance a home purchase with a mortgage. Such a
penalty is disturbing for reasons that can be described as both horizontal and vertical equity. From the viewpoint of horizontal equity, it
makes no sense to impose different tax liabilities on two individuals
merely because one has borrowed against her home and the other has
borrowed against some other asset. From the viewpoint of vertical
equity, wealthier individuals are more likely to be able to fund home
purchases out of equity or by borrowing against other assets. Thus,
the exclusion of mortgage debt would tend to reduce the progressivity
of the tax structure. Moreover, given the (self-imposed) constraint of
a flat wealth tax, the ability to compensate for the exclusion is limited.
ss IRC § 163(h).
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From the viewpoint of efficiency, any tax-induced shift from mortgage
debt to nonmortgage debt would be expected to represent an efficiency loss to society.
We provide estimates of the wealth tax under several alternative
assumptions including a scenario meant to mimic current law and a
scenario without any special treatment of housing.
H.

Liabilities (Other Than iVlortgage Debt)

The wealth tax is intended to be a tax on net worth, not on gross
wealth. Thus, the fair market value of liabilities generally should be
deductible from the tax base. In certain cases, it is likely that liabilities would receive special treatment. For example, as discussed above,
home mortgage debt is excluded in the base case. 86 Also, it is likely to
be desirable to adopt special valuation rules for many types of debt. 87
For example, consumer debt is likely to be valued at face. 88 Finally, as
discussed below, special rules are likely to be required for contingent
liabilities.
I.

Contingent Assets and Liabilities

Many assets are difficult to value because they represent highly contingent claims. For example, a tort victim may have a valuable contingent claim against a tortfeasor without even being aware of the claim.
It would be impractical to include such claims in the tax base. At the
same time, the tortfeasor will have an identical contingent liability,
which may be only slightly easier to value than the contingent claim.
The obvious solution is to ignore both, thus, generally insuring the
correct tax base, if not necessarily the correct taxpayers.
86 Home mortgage debt should be included to the extent that it exceeds the fair market
value of the home.
87 Historically, with the income tax, there has been a much greater willingness to accept
debt at face value. In recent years, there has been a push towards finding methods to value
debt more accurately. Even, in complex transactions, however, there is a preference for set
valuation rules rather than true fair market value. See, e.g., IRC § 1274 (generally permiting taxpayers to value assets based on an above-market interest rate and, in the case of a
below-market interest rate, only increases the rate to the federal borrowing rate). For a
more recent example, see the special valu ation rules for valuing certain debt contributed to
a FASIT. IRC § 8601.
88 A separate decision would have to be made as to whether holders of consumer debt
would be required to include the asset at face or at fair market value. For example, if
holders of distressed consumer debt were required to include such debt at face value, the
likely revenue loss on the consumer side from overstated liabilities would be made up by
increased liability on the holder side. Such treatment, however, would raise the cost of
consumer debt and may be politically unattractive. Of course, under current law, taxpayers generally cannot deduct interest on consumer debt while holders must include the interest, and there seems to be little pressure to change this result.
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There are several problems, however, with simply ignoring contingent claims and liabilities. First, doing so requires ide ntifying th ose
assets and liabilities that are too contingent to value. H olders would
have an incentive to argue that the claims are too contingent to value,
while those with liabilities would argue that they are sufficiently fixed
to take into account. 89 Presumably, rul es could be developed to clarify the line between contingent and noncontingent claims. Second ,
where one side of a transaction was a foreign person or otherwise not
a taxpayer, ignoring the contingent claim/liability would not be
neutral
Finally, ignoring the contingent claim would not work if th e assets
of a corporation were valued by reference to the value of the interests
in the corporation. Failing to include the claims in the wealth tax bases of the holder of the claim would reduce the tax b ase.
].

Human Capital and th e Wage Tax

A s an initial theoretical matter, there does not appear to be any
reason to treat human capital differently from any other source of
wealth. A tax system that taxed only inanimate wealth and failed to
tax human capital would make little sense from either an equity or
efficiency point of view. From an equity standpoint, such a tax would
discriminate against savers to an unacceptable degree. 9 Compare, for
example , Spendthrift and Saver. Spendthrift earns $200,000 per year
and spends it all on riotous living (or for that matter on pious contemplation). Saver earns only $50,000 per year and by living frugally
saves $20,000. After 10 years, Spendthrift has accumulated nothing
and, assuming a 5% rate of return, Saver has accumulated about
$260,000. If the wealth tax were designed with a modest credit of
$1 ,900 and was intended to replace both the personal and corporate
income taxes, it would require a rate of about 5.7 % .91 At th at rate ,
Spendthrift would owe nothing and Saver would owe about $14,800,
more than 100% of his income from his savings. Such a result is absurd. From an efficiency point of view, such a high rate on wealth
would act as a severe disincentive to save.
We therefore turn to human capital , an important category of
wealth that does not show up on most balance sheets. Taxing human
capital raises all sorts of questions. Measuring human capital is
fraught with difficulties. We assumed that it would be wrong, or at

°

89 Similar problems under the current income tax are muted by the requirem ent of economic performance before accruing a liability. IRC § 461(h).
90 We use the term "savers" to refe r to people who invest in inanim ate capital. Education is an example of a investment in human capital.
91 See Table 11 on page 555.
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least unacceptable, to tax people (such as academics?) based on how
much income they could earn if they conducted themselves according
to their most profitable use. Therefore, we chose to tax human capital
measured by the amount of income actually earned by the taxpayer.
O f course, considerations of administrability dictate such a solution,
even if moral and political considerations did not.
We considered taxing human capital , as so evidenced, based on two
alternative structures. Under a simple structure, we would look at
how much a person earns and translate that amount into a figure for
human capital based on a uniform capitalization measure. For example , if we concluded that salaries represent a 15% return on
(nondepreciating) human capital, then human capital would equal 6.7
times each person's salary. Hence, we would tax salaries at 6.7 times
the rate otherwise applied to wealth. For example, using this 15%
assumption, we could tax all other wealth at 2% and salaries at 13.3%.
Whatever the justification for the simplified method, it is in effect a
fiat-rate wage tax.
A more sophisticated approach to human capital would take into
account not only the current return on a person's human capital but
also the expected useful life of the human capital asset. Thus, if we
are really trying to measure human capital, we would rightly conclude
that a healthy 25-year old making $40,000 has more human capital
than a 65-year old making $40,000.
Obviously, these two approaches have very different effects on the
burden a wealth tax would impose on taxpayers of different ages. The
method chosen would depend on one's justification for choosing a
wealth tax. A purist might argue that wealth is the appropriate base,
human capital is part of wealth, and the value of human capital should
be measured as accurately as possible. On the other hand, if one felt
that income was the right base on which a tax should be imposed, one
nevertheless might choose a wealth tax with respect to assets other
than human capital because of the great difficulty in trying to measure
the income from those other assets. Since, however, wages are generally easy to measure, one could apply an income tax directly to
wages. 92 Even if one believed that wealth was a better measure of
ability to pay than income when dealing with inanimate wealth, one
still might believe that wages were a better measure of ability to pay
than a more accurate measure of human capital. Thus, for example,
one might be happy to dispense with the realization requirement for
inanimate capital, but not for human capital.
92 Except where the context makes it clear otherwise, we use the term wages to refer to
all forms of earned income.
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At least for now, we decided to use a straight wage tax in lieu of a
more complicated capitalization method. First, any more complex system would have to use a very limited amount of data in order to determine the value of each individual's human capital. The most likely
approach would use only the individual's age and his earned income
for the year to determine his human capital. Such a system likely
would be seen as highly arbitrary and unfair. In addition, any system
that imposed different tax rates based on age would increase administrative costs. 93 Second, we believe that there are serious limitations
on the ability to borrow against human capital. Therefore, a realization-based system is likely to be fairer than a system that taxes based
on future earning potential.
Essentially, therefore, our "wealth" tax consists of two taxes, a tax
on earned income and a tax on inanimate wealth. We refer to the tax
on earned income as a wage tax. We refer to the tax on inanimate
wealth as a tax on net worth. Collectively, we refer to the taxes as a
wealth tax. Having two essentially separate taxes means that, for any
given revenue target, it is possible to vary the tax between a pure
wage tax and a pure inanimate wealth tax by varying the respective
tax rates.
Whatever method is chosen for capitalizing wages, the co-existence
of a wage tax and net worth tax poses what could be a serious administrative problem with our wealth tax. The consequence of opting for
a wealth tax in respect of inanimate assets is that the income from
those assets is not taxed. Specifically, the earnings from a business
would not be taxed to the owner, although the salary he received from
the business would be. It is, however, notoriously difficult to distinguish the salary of a business owner from the return the owner gets
from owning the business.
Of course, the problem of distinguishing earned and unearned income is not unknown under the income tax. For example, for closely
held C corporations, it is necessary to distinguish between deductible
salary and nondeductible dividends. 94 Under current law, in theory,
the self-employment tax should be imposed only on earned income,
yet no attempt is made to distinguish between earned and unearned
income of sole proprietors. Similarly, § 911 is supposed to be an exclusion only for earned income of U.S. taxpayers resident abroad. 95
93 For example, an age-based system also generally would provide an incentive to defer
compensation to a later year with a smaller multiplier.
94 Interestingly, with a wealth tax, the Service would find it was on the other side of the
traditional salary versus dividend dispute.
95 Prior to 1981, a maximum tax rate applied to earned income. Former IRC § 1348,
repealed by The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat.
172, 183. Congress repealed § 1348 when it lowered general tax rates.
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Nevertheless, given the high stakes under the wealth tax, we would
expect the problem to be more troublesome.
There are, however, countervailing factors that may limit the extent
to which a taxpayer's ability to characterize salary as dividends or retained earnings can be used to avoid the wealth tax. In particular, one
of the most common ways that businesses are valued is by reference to
the present value of the earnings of the business. Thus, if a taxpayer
recharacterizes salary as a dividend or retained earnings, the additional net profits potentially will increase the valuation of the business
not merely by the amount of the earnings, but also by the present
value of a stream of income equal to the earnings. 96
Whether, given the effect on valuation, it would remain in the taxpayer's interest to characterize the salary as a dividend would depend
on a variety of factors including the relative rates as between the wage
and net worth taxes, the expected life of the business, and the discount
rate used to value the business. An example may help clarify the
ISSUe.

Example 10: T is the sole shareholder and employee of a
corporation that is engaged in a service business with no tangible assets. The business produces $10,000 of profit before
payment of wages. Assume that net worth was taxed at 1.5%
and wages were taxed at 15%. Assume that the business was
valued for purposes of the net profit tax by discounting its
earnings stream at 6%.
If the business pays wages of $10,000 toT, he would have a
wage tax liability of $1 ,500. Since the net profits of the business are zero, the business would have a valuation of zero
and there would be no net worth tax on the business.
If the business pays a dividend of $10,000, T would have
no wage tax liability. The net profits of the business, however, will have increased to $10,000. If it is assumed that the
business will produce annual earnings of $10,000 for an expected life of 10 years, the business would be valued at
$73,601 and T would owe a net worth tax of $1,104. 97 By
treating his salary as a dividend, T would have reduced his
net tax liability by $396 (26% ).
If, however, it was assumed that the income would continue for 15 years, the value of the business would increase to
$97,122 and the net worth tax would increase to $1,457, a
96 We are grateful to Professor James Repetti for pointing out to us the interplay between wages and the value of a business discussed here.
97 $73,601 is the present value at 6% of $10,000 per year for 10 years. $1,104 = $73,601 x

1.5 % .
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savings of only $43 (4% ). If it was assumed that the income
would continue for 20 years, the value of the business would
increase to $114,699 and the net worth tax would increase to
$1,720, $220 more than the wage tax (15%).

IV .

AN

OVERVIEW OF A WEALTH TAX

Before we examine a wealth tax based on disaggregate data, we use
aggregate data to get an overview of what a wealth tax might look
like. In this Section, we look at the rates that would be required if a
wealth tax replaced either the current personal income tax or both the
personal and corporate income taxes. We offer rates using a variety of
wealth tax bases.
For these computations we use the wealth data from the Federal
Reserve's Flow of Funds data shown in Tables 2 and 3. 98 For data on
earned income, we use estimates drawn from the Internal Revenue
Service's Statistics of Income. 99 We assume no exemptions or credits.100 Estimates of personal and corporate income taxes also are
taken from the Statistics of Income. All data is for 1994.
Aggregate personal income tax collections for 1994 were approximately $538 billion. 101 Aggregate corporate tax collections were approximately $138 billion.l 02 Combined collections were therefore
$676 billion. The necessary rate on net worth depends on essentially
three variables: the size of the asset base, the rate on earned income,
and the taxes being replaced. Table 4 shows the necessary tax rate on
net worth under various combinations of these parameters.
The broadest tax base, including all assets and liabilities in the
household sector, is shown in Row 1. 103 Assuming no wage tax, a rate
of 2.8% on net worth would be required to replace the individual and
See pages 527-28.
IRS Statistics of Income 1994: Individual Income Tax Returns (1997) [hereinafter
SOl]. Our estimate of earned incomes include wages and salaries, pensions, net business
and professional income, one-half of partnership and subchapter S income, and unemployment compensation.
100 Although we assume no exemptions or credits, the SOl includes data only on filers.
Id. at 19. Thus, we implicitly exempt low income individuals from the wage portion of the
wealth tax.
101 There are a variety of different definitions of the taxes paid in the SOL We use "total
income tax" and then add back in "earned income credit used to offset income tax before
credits." See id. at 36 tbl. 1.3, col. 2. Total income tax includes the alternative minimum
tax. Id. at 128.
102 See IRS, Statistics of Income Bull. 214 tbl. 17 (fiscal year 1994 corporate tax collections of $154,205 million), 216 tbl. 18 (fiscal year 1994 corporate tax refunds of $16,251
million) (Summer 1999).
tm The "broadest base" could be expanded further by the addition of assets owned by
nonprofits and foreign persons.
98
99
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3 Line 2 minus housing
assets a nd mortgages,
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consume r durabl es
4 Line 3 with mortgage
liabilities included

Ner wonh
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B

Base as %
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Individual only

With
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wage tax
E

Wirh out
wage tax

Wii/1
15%
wage tax

c

Withoul
wage tax
D

F

G

$24 ,230

100

2.8

0.6

2.2

0.04

18,870

78

3.6

0. 8

2.9

0.1

13,571

56

5.0

1.1

4.0

0.1

10.475

43

6.5

1.4

5.2

0.1

corporate income taxes, and 2.2% for the personal income tax only.
With a 15% wage tax, the rate on net worth would drop to .6% and
.4% for the personal income tax only. These rates are quite low.
They are unrealistic, however, because of the likelihood that the base
would be considerably narrower.
The next smaller base would exclude net pensions and life insurance. This exclusion reduces the base from about $24.2 trillion to
about $18.9 trillion, 78 % of the full base. Due to the reduction in
base, the required rates on net worth to replace both taxes increase to
3.6% with no wage tax and .8% with a wage tax.
If homes, home mortgages, and one-half of consumer durables are
removed from the base, the base falls to $13.6 trillion, 56% of the full
base, and the required rates on net worth increase to 5% without the
wage tax and 1.1% with the wage tax. Finally, if home mortgages are
included in the base, the base is further reduced to $10.5 trillion, 43%
of the full base. The required rates on net worth would increase further to 6.5% and 1.4%, without and with the wage tax, respectively.
The results in this Section are necessarily very rough. Most significantly, they do not take into account personal exemptions or credits,
the presence of which could increase rates substantially. Nevertheless,
they are useful in giving a preliminary idea of the amount of outstanding assets and the rates necessary to replace income taxes.
In the next Section, we describe the data set that we use to look at
wealth on a disaggregate level, the Survey of Consumer Finance. In
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the following Sections, we examine a wealth tax based on that data
set.
V.

TnE DATA SET-THE SuRvEY OF CoNSUMER FINANCES

In order to study the wealth tax on an individual level, rather than
on a purely aggregate level, we need information on individual wealth
holdings . The most comprehensive source of such information is the
Survey of Consumer Finances (the "SCF"), which is compiled by the
Federal Reserve Board every three years. 104 In this Article, we use
data from the 1995 survey. The SCF is designed to be used for studying wealth. So, while a part of the sample is chosen randomly, the
SCF also uses information from high-income tax returns to identify a
fuller sample of high-wealth taxpayers.
The SCF compiles extensive information on each respondent in the
sample. A respondent is generally the economically dominant individual in a household. A household is divided into two parts, the "primary economic unit" ("PEU") , which can be a group much larger
than would be included on a tax return, and others (" non-PEU members"). In general, PEU members include the core family in the
household. Non-PEU members include boarders, servants, economically independent children living at home, and others.
Respondents are asked for information including value about assets
in many different categories. They are asked for basic demographic
data, such as the ages of the head or heads of the household. They are
asked for some tax information, including filing status (married, single, filing separate returns) , and AGI (the item on a tax return that is
likely to come closest to a relatively pure definition of income). They
are not asked, however, for information about their taxable income or
how much tax they pay. Detailed information is collected for those in
the PEU; summary information is collected for those not in the PEU.
The 1995 SCF reports information from 4,299 respondents. For
each respondent, the survey reports the answers to approximately
2,500 questions.l 05 The actual interviews took from about five min104 The SCF is available on the Federal Reserve Board 's Web site at <http://
www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/oss/oss2/95/scf95home.html>. We use the term SCF both to refer
to the actual survey and to refer to the office in the Federal Reserve Board that is responsible for the survey. The meaning should be clear from the context. The primary description
of the survey, including the definition of all variables, is contained in Arthur Kennickel,
Federal Reserve Board Codebook for 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (Codebook),
available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/oss/oss2/95scf95home.html>. For further discussions of the methodology used in conducting the survey, see the papers available at
<http://www.bog.frb.fed. us/pubs/oss/oss2/method.html>.
105 The actual survey consists of more than 2,500 questions, but many answers are not on
the public use data set because of privacy concerns.
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utes to a little over nine hours. The average interview lasted about
100 minutes. 106
Of course, the accuracy of the information collected is subject to
many questions. Problems range from sampling error to a respondent's unwillingness to reveal sensitive private information, to response bias. Many of the answers are missing. In the case of missing
answers, answers are imputed based on the remaining answers. Obviously, the imputation process is another source of error. 107
The SCF is designed to estimate the wealth holding of the entire
U.S. population. In order to do so, the Federal Reserve Board estimates a set of weights, one for each respondent. The weights add up
to 99,010,458, the number of households in the United States in 1994.
Thus, each observation is intended to represent a different number of
households. The average weight is 23,031, with a range from 7 to
69,337. The median weight is 25,504.1°8 The estimation of the weights
introduces further errors into the process.l 09
Privacy concerns place further restrictions on the SCF. In order to
get people to agree to be interviewed, the Federal Reserve Board
promises strict confidentiality. In addition, the use of tax return data
to select possible respondents introduces further restrictions on public
release of the data. In order to assure confidentially, the Federal Reserve Board takes a number of steps, some of which are disclosed and
some of which are not. Disclosed steps include deleting specified variables from the public-use data set, 110 switching answers between respondents, changing answers, setting answers to missing, top- or

See Variable X7398 (length of interview in seconds).
In addition to introducing possible bias, the imputation process also means that conventional estimates of standard errors are incorrect. To enable users to estimate standard
errors, the SCF provides five estimates for each imputed value. Thus, the SCF dataset
consists of five full sets of answers to each question. Each set is referred to as an implicate.
For the work reported here, we generally have used only the first implicate. Use of only
the first (or any other) implicate should provide unbiased estimates.
108 See Variable X42000.
109 In addition to adjusting standard errors for errors introduced by estimation of missing values (see note 107), it is necessary to adjust standard errors for the imprecision of the
weights. Each implicate has its own set of estimated weights. In addition, the Federal
Reserve Board provides an additional 999 replicate weights that can be used to further
refine estimates of standard deviations. We do not report standard errors in this Article.
no Examples of variables that are not in the public data set include whether the respondent was chosen randomly or from the high-income sample, specific dates (such as the
purchase date of a residence or the respondent's birth month), the make and model of
automobiles, many sample design variables, and the location of residence.
106

107
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bottom-coding variables ,111 and reducing the number of categories in
an answer. 112
O bviously, there are severe limitations to the data. Whatever its
limitations, however, the SCF is acknowledged to be the best data set
available for information on wealth holdings. Thus, we are unapologetic about our decision to use it. On the other h and, it is importan t
to keep its limitations in mind when evaluating our results.
VI.

DESIGN OF THE TAX

As we discussed above, the basic structure of our wealth tax is a fiat
tax on earned income combined with a fiat tax on net worth. A pure
fiat tax is, however, unacceptable from an equitable point of view (and
probably administratively as well). Any significant socially acceptable
type of tax must provide some type of exemption. The exact form of
an exemption is less certain. There are essentially two possible exemption structures. One is an exemption that relates to a particular
category of asset. The other is an exemption that applies to a tax return or to an individual. A realistic tax system is likely to combine
both types. 113
The easiest exemption to justify is one aimed at the individual's
overall wealth (including earned income). Since the premise of the
wealth tax is that wealth is a good measure of how well-off an individual is, presumably those with the least wealth are worst-off and, therefore, should benefit from an exemption. Thus, the exemption should
be tied to individuals' wealth and not to the particular assets they prefer to hold. Such an exemption is the equivalent of the personal exemption and standard deduction in the current income tax, provisions
that add significant progressivity to the income tax.
An individual exemption presents a variety of design issues. The
first is whether there should be separate exemptions for the wage and
net worth portions of the tax or a single combined exemption. For
111 For example, number of children not living with the responent is top-coded at 10.
SCF, note 104, Variable X5910. The number of inheritances or substantial gifts is topcoded at 5. Id. Variable X5801.
112 For example, law degrees, medical degrees, and certain other doctorates are combined into a single answer. ld. Variable X5905. Similarly, the practice of law is combined
with, among other professions, barbers and parking lot operators.
For a discussion of the steps taken to prevent disclosure and the implication of those
procedures, see Arthur Kennickel, (Nov. 1997); G . Fries, B. Johnson, R.L. Woodburn, An alyzing the Disclosure Review Procedures for the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances,
(Sept. 1997), Multiple Imputation and Disclosure Protection: The Case of the 1995 Survey
of Consumer Finances, both available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed .us/pubs/oss/oss2/
method.html>.
113 In a progressive tax structure, it is important whether an exemption is styled as a
deduction or a tax credit. With a fiat tax rate th e difference is not important.
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example , it would be possible to exempt the first $5,000 of earn ed
income and the first $40,000 of net worth. There seems to be no reason, however, that someone with, for example, $5,500 in wages and no
assets should be paying tax, while someone with $40,000 in assets and
$5 ,000 in wages is entirely exempt. Rather, it would be fairer to integrate the two exemptions. The easiest way to do so is through a unified tax credit that can be applied against the sum of the two taxes.
The next step is to determine the filing unit and how the credit
would be adjusted for family size. The approach we suggest provides
for joint filing and a two-level exemption. A larger exemption is provided for one or two heads of household and a smaller exemption is
provided for each member of the family. At this stage, our goal is to
pick numbers that exempt many of the same wage-earning families as
the income tax currently exempts. 114 The figures we use for our base
case are a $1,500 credit for one or two heads of a household and a
$400 credit for each member of the household (including the heads of
household). 115 We use alternative figures to explore the effect of the
exemption level on progressivity and tax rates. We treat the credit as
nonrefundable.
Table 5 compares the income and wealth tax imposed on low-income taxpayers assuming the above-mentioned wealth tax credits and
the personal exemption and the standard deduction in the income tax.
For an individual or family earning $15,000 a year in salary and no
substantial assets, and an assumed wealth tax rate of 18% on wages,
the wealth tax is generally substantially less than the current income
tax. For example, for a married couple with one child, the income tax
liability would be $218 and the wealth tax liability would be zero. For
a single parent with one child, the income tax liability would be $960
and the wealth tax liability would be only $400.
The joint return structure means that there might be a marriage bonus, but could not be a marriage penalty.l 16 The marriage bonus
arises when a person with precredit tax liability in excess of the credit
ll4 We speak of wage-earning families because we are aware that our wealth tax would
cause some retired families with low income but high wealth to be taxed. Also, we have
not taken into account some welfare-like provisions of the current income tax , notably the
earned income credit.
115 Measured against the 15% rate bracket, the 1994 personal exemption of $2,450 was
worth $367.50. The 1994 standard deduction for an individual was worth $570; for married
filing jointly, it was worth $476.25 per person; for a head of household, it was worth $840.
We use 1994 numbers because 1994 is the year for which we model our wealth tax.
116 We speak in terms of married couples, but are not committed to any particular definition of couples eligible to file a joint return. The SCF includes both spouses and partners
in the definition of the primary economic unit. Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-McCluer & Anita E. Sunden, Family Finances in the U.S.: Evidence From the Survey of
Consumer Finances, Federal Reserve Bull. 23 (Jan. 1997).
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5

CoMPAR ISON OF I NCOME A.l~D WEALTH

T.<L"X

FOR

Low

INCOME TAXPAYERS

Marital status
Single
Single
Married
Married
Married

Children

Incom e tax

Wealth tax

0
1
0
1
2

$1,320
960
578
218
0

$800
400

0
0
0

Taxpayers are assume d to have $15,000 in salary and no asse ts.
Income tax is for 1994 and assumes the standard deduction.
Wealth tax assumes 18 % rate on wages, a credit of $1,500 per head of household, and
a credit of $400 per pe rson.

marries someone with precredit tax liability less than the credit.
Under the base case, the maximum marriage bonus is $1 ,900. 117 We
do not propose a structure with a marriage bonus out of a belief that a
bonus is a desirable attribute of a tax structure, but rather because the
bonus flows from the progressive nature of the tax (through the exemption) combined with the belief that joint filing is a useful administrative device (particularly with regard to net worth), a marriage
bonus is preferable to a marriage penalty, and a marriage bonus at the
level specified is not seriously objectionable.l 18
The wealth tax structure also raises issues of income and asset shifting within the family. So far we have not focused on the issue of shifting. Assuming that the wealth tax is like the current income tax
where, in general, children are treated as separate taxpayers, there
would be an incentive to shift some assets to a child's name. Given
the limited size of the credit, and the flat rate once the credit is ex117 By contrast, under the income tax, the maximum marriage bonus was $6,540.72. The
maximum marriage bonus was reached when a single person earning be tween $166,801 and
$167,700 married an individual with no income. Over that range, the couple's standard
deduction increased from $3,800 (single standard deduction) to $6,350 (joint standard deduction), and their personal exemptions increased from $1,323 (one exemption with 46 %
phased out) to $4,900 (two exemptions without phaseout). In addition , the married couple
gets the advantage of expanded 15 %, 28%, and 31% brackets. The estimate takes into
account only the rate structure, personal exemptions (including phaseout), and the standard deduction. By taking into account losses or itemized deductions, the marriage bonus
can be made indefinitely (and unrealistically) large. Figures for the income tax are for
1994, the year for which we model the wealth tax.
118 If it were desirable to lower the marriage bonus, it would be possible to provide a
combined credit that is less than twice the individual credit. Such a change would be likely
to create many more marriage penalties then it would reduce marriage bonuses. The only
way to prevent either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus is to require separate filing.
Even then, separate filing requirements could be avoided easily by shifting assets between
wife and husband , thus, in effect, reintroducing the marriage bonus de facto if not de jure.
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ceeded, shifting to children does not appear to be a particularly important issue. It is possible that rules would have to be developed,
like the rules in the current income tax, that restrict exemptions from
being used on multiple returns.l 19 Rules equivalent to the so-called
kiddie tax would not be required because of the fiat rate.l 20
Exemptions for categories of assets are harder to justify than individual exemptions. If the purpose of the exemption is to help people
who are less well-off, it is generally more efficient to target such individuals directly by reference to their level of wealth, rather than indirectly by reference to their choice of assets. Thus, for example, it may
be that poor people are more likely to own mobile homes, and thus,
one could target relief to poor people by exempting mobile homes,
but such an approach is likely to be less effective than simply targeting
poor people directly.l 21 In addition to being an inferior means of
targeting an exemption, exempting specific assets is often inefficient
because it distorts an investor's choice of assets. For example, an exemption for mobile homes would encourage people to live in mobile
homes despite the fact that they would prefer to rent an apartment.
Nevertheless, a realistic system is likely to exempt certain assets for
a variety of reasons. First, it may be that while, in general, wealth is a
good proxy for well-being, it is not a perfect proxy and can be improved upon by using additional indicia. For example, the medical
expense deduction often is justified on the ground that people in bad
health have lower welfare than people in good health. An exemption
under the wealth tax for, say, durable medical equipment could be
justified on the same ground.
Second, exemptions for assets can be supported to encourage their
purchase. Exemptions for housing and for pension assets can be justified under this rubric.1 22 As indicated earlier, we do not think it likely
that owner-occupied residences would be taxed like other assets and,
for our base case, we have exempted net housing equity up to $1 million.l23 We also assumed that pension reserves would be the subject
of special treatment. In our base case, we exempt pension assets. Our
119 See, e.g. , IRC § 62 (dependent standard deduction) , § 151 (denial of exemption to
dependents).
12o IRC § 1(g) (taxing children's income over a threshold amount at their parent's marginal rate).
121 Sales taxes often exempt food and clothing as a means of making the tax less regressive. In the context of sales taxes, a justification for exempting certain goods, rather than
providing a taxpayer exemption is that absent a system of taxpayer returns, it is difficult to
provide exemptions to individuals.
122 Exempting assets to encourage their purchase is more in the nature of an efficiency
than an equity rationale.
123 IRC § III.G.
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model leaves open the possibility that a tax at a rate less than 100% of
the regular tax might apply to pension assets.124
Finally, assets may be exempt for administrative reasons. In this
regard, we assume an exemption for most consumer durables . 125 Assets also may be exempt because they are too difficult to value. For
example, some contingent tort claims may be considered too difficult
to value.
VII .

REsULTs-WHAT A

U.S .

WEALTH TAx M IGHT

L o oK LIKE

In this Section, we use the SCF to compute aggregate figures for
earned income and net worth. Using these figures and our figures for
personal credits, we provide estimates of tax rates that would be sufficient to replace either the personal income tax or both the personal
and corporate income taxes in the United States. We then explore
alternative ways to raise the same amount of revenue
A.

Net Worth and I ts Components

The SCF collects information on net worth. Table 6 contains a list
of major categories of assets and liabilities along with the household
mean for each category and the estimated total for all households.
Except for the last two lines of Table 6, all data in the table are for
members of the primary economic unit only. Table 7 contains data for
members of the household who are not members of the primary economic unit. The data from Table 7 is summarized in the penultimate
row of Table 6 and is included in the total net worth figure in the last
row of Table 6.
Total net worth is estimated to be $19 trillion, of which only .95% is
from non-PEU members. Putting aside non-PEU members, gross assets are about $22.8 trillion and liabilities are about $3.9 trillion for net
worth of $18.8 trillion. 126
As can be seen from Table 6, financial assets are $6.7 trillion, about
29% of gross assets. The remaining 71% of gross assets consists of
nonfinancial assets, the most important categories of which are pri124 At present, our estimate of pension assets, particularly in defined benefit plans, is
quite weak. In future research, we intend to use sources from outside the SCF to estimate
total reserves and use the information in the SCF to allocate aggregate resources among
participants.
125 See Subsection III.D. for a fuller discussion of the treatment of consumer durables.
126 Our definition of net worth is generally the same as that used by the SCF with two
exceptions. First, the SCF includes certain types of liquid retirement accounts, including
IRAs, Keoghs, and other retirement plans with cash values. The estimate in Table 6 includes no retirement wealth. Second, the SCF, apparently for historical reasons. includes
bonds at face value. We include bonds at fair market value.
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TABLE

NET WoRTH DATA -

PRIMARY EcoNOMIC UNITS

Description

Assets
Financial Asse ts
Liquid Accounts (checking, savings) ,
Money market and call accounts)
Certificates of deposit
Mutual funds other than money market)
Stocks
Bonds (other than savings bonds)
Savings bonds
Cash value of life insurance
Other managed assets
Other financial assets
Total Financial Assets
Nonfinancial Assets
Vehicles
Primary residences
Investment real estate
Business interests
Other nonfinancial assets
Total Nonfinancial Assets
Total Assets
Liabilities
Mortgages (including home equity loans)
Other lines of credit
Other real estate debt
Credit card balances
Installment debt
Other debt
Total Debt
Net worth
Assets-liabilities from PEU
Net worth of non-PEU members
Total net worth

6

Mean

Total
(billions)

Percent of gross
assets or
liabilities

$13,261
5,094
11,733
14,081
6,427
1,208
6,582
5,821
2,991
67,198

$1,313
504
1,162
1,394
636
120
652
576
296
6,653

5.8
2.2
5.1
6.1
2.8
0.5
2.9
2.5
1.3
29.2

11,283
74,845
28,238
44,782
3,701
162,850
230,048

1,117
7,410
2,796
4,434
366
16,124
22,777

4.9
32.5
12.3
19.5
1.6
70.8
100.0

26,891
219
6,020
1,428
4,407
917
39,882

2,662
22
596
141
436
91
3,949

67.4
0.5
15.1
3.6
11.1
2.3
100.0

190,166
13,008

18,828
181
19,009

Source: SCF-Authors' computations
Except as indicated, includes assets and liabilities from primary economic units only.
Mean is computed per household, not pe r individual.

mary residences ($7.4 trillion, 32.5% ), business interests ($4.4 trillion,
19.5% ), and investment real estate ($2.8 trillion, 12% ).
The primary category of liabilities is home mortgages (and home
equity lines of credit), which total $2.7 billion or 67% of liabilities.
Other real estate debt totals $0.6 trillion (15%) and installment debt is
$0.4 trillion (11% ).
The figures for net worth do not include any estimates of retirement
wealth. Our preliminary estimate of retirement wealth based on the
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NoN-PEU

TABLE

NET WoRTH DATA -

Description

Assets
Bank accounts and savings bonds
Primary residences
Vehicles
Other assets
Total assets
Liabilities
Mortgages
Other debts
Total debts
Net worth
Assets-Liabilities

ME:rviBERS

Mean*

Total
(billions)

$2,581
1,404
5,238
7,665
16,888

$ 36
20
73
107
235

235
3,645
3,880

3
51
54

$13,008

$181

Source: SCF - Authors' computations
Includes only people not part of a primary economic unit.
* Mean is per household, including the assets and liabilities of all members of the
household who are not members of the primary economic unit.

SCF is $3 trillion. We know this figure to be too low. 127 By contrast,
the flow of funds estimate for pension fund reserves is $4.9 trillion. 128

B.

Wages and Other Earned Income

Data on wages and other forms of earned income are included in
Table 8. The first part of the table contains information on members
of the primary economic unit and the second part has information on
those who are not members of the primary economic unit. In the aggregate, members of the primary economic unit have earned income
of $4.1 trillion. Nonmembers have aggregate earned income of $172
billion, approximately 4% of total earned income.
Wages and salaries represent 79% of earned income among members of the primary economic unit. Business and profession income
and pension income each represents approximately 10% of earned income. Among individuals that are not part of the primary economic
unit, the percentage of income from pensions goes up to 13% and the
percentage from business and professional sources drops to 2.5%.
Wage and salary income takes up the slack, increasing to 84%.

127 Our current estimate includes IRAs, Keoghs, defined contribution plans, and estimates of the present value of future retirement benefits from defined benefit plans for
those who are currently employed. Our estimate does not include the value of retirement
benefits from defined benefit plans in current pay status. Obviously, so far we have failed
to include a substantial source of retirement wealth.
12s See Table 2, on page 527.
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8

EARNED INCOME DATA

Mean

Total
(billions)

Percent of
income

$33 ,028
4,123
170
205
351
4,092
82
(312)

$3 ,270
408
17
20
35
405
8
(31)

79.1
9.9

9.8
0.2
-0.7

Total Income-PEU
Earned Income of non-PEU members
Wage and salary income
Pension and social security income
Business and professional income

$41,739

$4,133

100.0

$10,414
2,939
306

$145
41
4

84.4

Total Income-Non-PEU members
Total Earned Income of all people

$13 ,659

$190*
$4,322*

100.0

Description

Earned Income of PEU Members
Wages and salaries
Business and professional income
Unemployment compensation
Alimony receipts
Welfare
Pension income
Other income
Alimony payments

0.4
0.5

0.8

13.1
2.5

Source: Authors' computations
Mean is computed per household , not per individual.
* Total does not sum due to rounding

C.

Household Data

Tables 9-11 contain data on household structure. The basic unit
used by the SCF is the PEU. The SCF defines a PEU as "an economically dominant single individual or couple (married or living as partners) in a household and all other individuals in the household who
are financially dependent on that individual or couple. " 129 For the
most part, we adopted the SCF's household structure.
Table 9 indicates that there are 99 million households or PEUs. Of
these, 41 million have a single head of household and 58 million have
two heads of household.l 30 We consider a family to be all members of
the PEU. Families in the SCF dataset have from one to nine members
(including the head or heads). The average family size is 2.4 people.
In addition to the PEUs, we have minimal information on other
people living in the household who are not members of the PEU. Table 10 summarizes the non-PEU members. There are 13.9 million
households that have members who are not members of the PEU.
As shown in Table 10, in 74% of the cases, or 10.3 million households, there is only a single non-PEU member and, a fortiori, only one
head of household. With respect to the 3.6 million households with
more than one non-PEU member, we have not been able to deterSee Codebook, note 104.
That is, a household is considered to have two heads if the economically dominant
individual has a spouse or partner.
129

130
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DEMOGR~Pmcs- P RIIVL~RY EcoNOMIC UNITS

Distribution of Head of Households
Number of households

Percem

Households with single head
Households with two heads

41,107,561
57,902,897

42
58

Total Households

99,010,458

100

Number of head of households

Number of head of households

156,913,355

Family Size
Number of households

Percent

9

30,097,718
33,594,316
14,141,795
13,150,212
5,145,853
2,065,094
480,849
268,955
65,665

30.4
33.9
14.3
13.3
5.2
2.1
0.5
0.3
0.1

Total households

99,010,458

100.0

Number of people in PEU
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8

Total number of people
Average number per family

236,540,986
2.39

mine the family structure of the non-PEU members. In the absence of
such information, we arbitrarily decided that if there are additional
non-PEU members, they consist of a family with two heads. There is,
in general, no reason to believe that our assumption is true. To the
contrary, it might well be equally valid to assume that all non-PEU
members were independent individuals. Nevertheless, for the time
being, we report our results under the assumption that all non-PEU
members within a household constitute a single family. Under these
assumptions, there are a total of 17.5 million heads of household and
an average family size of 1.35 persons.
Given the information that we have on family structure and given
the credit that we adopt of $1,500 per head of household and $400 per
family member (including heads), we can estimate the maximum credits permitted under the wealth tax. The estimate is a maximum because it assumes that all credits are fully utilized. Given that the
credits are nonrefundable, not all credits would be utilized.131 A s
shown in Table 11, based on 255 million people and 174 million heads
of households, the maximum credit would be $364 billion. Given that
the combined personal and corporate income taxes collect $676 billion, the potential credit cost is substantial.

131

When we estimate taxes, below, we provide an estimate of credits actually used.
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10

D EMOG RAPHI CS - PEOPLE NOT MEMBE RS OF P RIMARY EC ONOMIC UNITS

Distribution of Head of H ouseholds
Num ber of head of households

Number of households

Percent

Households with single head
Households with two heads

10,254,87 1
3,644,080

74
26

Total households
Number of head of households
Households w/o non-PEU
members

13,898,951
17,543,030

100

85,111 ,507

Fam ily size

Numb er of people not in PEU

Number of households

Percent of
non-PEU
households

Percent of all
households

85,11 1,507
10,254,871
2,623,929
880,753
110,369
29,029

73 .8
18.9
6.3
0.8
0.2

86.0
10.4
2.7
0.9
0.1
0.0

100.0

14.0

0
1
2
3
4
5

Total Households with nonPEU members
Total number of people
Average number per
household (with one or more)

13,898,951
18,73 1,609
1.35

TABLE

ll

DEMOGRAPHICS -

CREDITS

Number of people living in PEUs
Number of people not living in PEUs

236,540,986
18,731,609

Total number of people
Number of head of households in PEUs
Number of head of households 's not living in
PEUs

255 ,272,594
156,913,355

Total number of head of households

174,456,385

Credit type

Head of household
Family member

17,543,030

A mount of credit

Num ber of credits
(millions)

Total credit cost
(billions)

$1,500
400

174
255

$262
102

Total
Total credit cost assumes all credits usable against tax liability.

D.

$364

B ase Case Tax

Based on the above, we would like to provide an estimate of the tax
rates for a wealth tax that would be necessary to raise sufficient revenue to replace the personal and corporate income taxes. Unfortunately, we still have not fully specified the tax. Since the wealth tax
has two parameters, the tax rate on net worth and the tax rate on
waaes
there is an infinite number of combinations of these two rates
b
'
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that would raise the requisite revenue. Table 12 shows combinations
of rates for the wealth tax that would raise sufficient revenue to replace either the individual income tax or both the individual and corporate income taxes.
TABLE
CoMBINATIONS oF WAGE

TAX

12

AND NET WoRTH

TAx

RATES

Net Worth Rate to Replace
Wage Tax Rate

Individual and Corporate Taxes

Individual Tax Only

0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
6.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
21.00
22.00
23.00
24.00
25.00

5.7
5.6
5.4
5.2
5.0
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.2
3.9
3.7
3.4
3.1
2.9
2.6
2.3
2.0
1.8
1.5
1.2
0.9
0.6
0.3
0.0
-0.4
-0.9

4.7
4.5
4.4
4.2
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
2.9
2.7
2.4
2.2
1.9
1.6
1.3
1.1
0.8
0.5
0.2
-0.1
-0.6
-1.2
-1.8
-2.6
-3.5

For example, if the wage tax rate were set at 18%, in order to replace both taxes, the rate on net worth would have to be 1.5%. If only
the individual tax were to be replaced, the rate on net worth would
need to be only .5%. At the extremes, if there were no wage tax, the
net worth rate would have to be 5.7% to replace both taxes (4.7% for
individual only), and if there were no net worth tax, the wage tax rate
would have to be 23% for both taxes (19.6% for individual only).
Figure 4 provides in a graphical format the same information as in
Table 12.

FIGURE

4

COMBINATIONS OF NET W OHTH AND AND WAGE TAX RATES NECE SSAHY TO HEP LACE TAXES SHOWN (ISO-REVENUE LlNES)
6% , --

----

- - - - - - -- -- ------------ - - -- - - - - -·

N
0
0
0
..__,

-··-·····----

~Individual and corporate income taxes

-----1

5% .j

>-

()

0

~

·1--------------~~~--------------~~----------------------------------------------------------------~

4o/o

'\:1

?:l
t'Ti

Q)

;r:

a:

z

t'Ti

ro

~
.c

(/)

3%

----J

-

t::

~

Q)

z

<
t'Ti
<
t'Ti

Individual income tax only

2%i--------------·------------------------~~~----~~~------------------------_j

>-

tj

::r:

,..,
?

><

1% T-------------------------------------------------------~----------~----------------~

Oo/o +---------------------r-------------------~r-------------------~------------------~-r----------~~------~

0%

5%

10%

15%
Wage Tax Rate

20%

25%

ll1

Ul
.......:J

558

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:

The lines shown on the graph are iso-revenue lines; each point on a
line would raise the same overall wealth tax. 132 In particular, for any
revenue target R, wage base W, and net worth base NW, the relationship between the tax rate on net worth TNw and the tax rate on wages
Tw would satisfy the following equation:

tNW

=

R

w

mv

NW

x tw

It is the presence of nonrefundable credits that causes the iso-revenues to be convex. As tax rates move to the extreme points, more
people are in an excess credit position, thus permitting a revenue target to be reached with lower tax rates. For example, assume that
there were only two individuals, one with lots of net worth and the
other with lots of wages. As long as both tax rates are sufficiently
large, both individuals would be taxable and, hence, both individuals
would be able to utilize their respective credits. If, however, only net
worth (or wages) were taxable, only the individual with net worth
(wages) would be taxable and eligible to use her credit. Thus, at the
extremes, the use of credits would fall by one-half.
At this stage in our research, we have not settled on a unique combination of net worth and wage tax rates to recommend. Nevertheless, we feel it is useful to suggest a reasonable pair of rates that can
be used as our base case. For this purpose, we settled on the requirement that the wealth tax raise approximately the same amount from
both capital and labor as do the taxes being replaced. We do not have
a strong justification for this requirement, but feel that it is a reasonable starting point.
We note that one of the clear advantages of a consumption tax over
the income tax is that the consumption tax generally does not burden
savings, while the income tax does. 133 Like the income tax, the wealth
tax places a burden on savings. What is relevant from an efficiency
point of view is the relative marginal burdens of the wealth tax versus
the income tax on capital. Our requirement that the two taxes raise
the same revenue from capital, therefore, does not guarantee that
they have the same efficiency cost. Nevertheless, given that the
wealth tax burdens capital more uniformly than does the income tax,
we suspect, but are not able to prove, that so long as the aggregate tax
burden on capital under the wealth tax is no greater than the aggregate tax burden on capital under the income tax, the efficiency loss
132 The iso-revenue lines are convex to the origin (that is, they are bowed out away from
the origin). If there were no credits, the iso-revenue lines would be straight lines.
133 See the discussion of taxes on capital in Subsection II.B.
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under the wealth tax will be no greater than the efficiency loss under
the income tax.
Another advantage in setting the base case so that the proportion of
the wealth tax that falls on capital is the same as for the income tax is
th at it makes the two taxes more nearly comparable. V.-/e would like to
determine whether the progressivity of the wealth tax (as measured
against AGI) comes from a more uniform taxation of capital, or
whether it comes from a heavier average taxation of capital. By linking the wealth tax to the income tax in this way, we are more confident that the progressivity we measure does not come from a heavier
average taxation of capital.
To determine the burden the current income tax imposes on capital
(as opposed to labor), we look separately at the individual and corporate income taxes. For the individual income tax, we base our calculations on summary statistics of the income of taxpayers and the taxes
they paid for 1994 1 34 , the year about which the SCF panel was questioned, rather than a more elaborate model based on data for a sample of representative individuals. We then make some simplifying
assumptions to calculate the tax's burden on labor. Since our data is
summarized by the AGI of taxpayers, we first assume that taxpayers
in a single AGI class have the same tax profile-specifically, that they
pay tax at the same rate. This assumption is obviously inaccurate, but
we think the classes are narrow enough that the assumption does not
seriously distort our results. We then try to determine what percentage of the AGI of taxpayers in each class can be considered income
from labor. This obviously includes wages. We also include all income from sole proprietorships, including professional practices. (We
treat income from businesses and professional practices reported in
the SCF as wages for purposes of our analyses.) In fact, income from
some businesses and professional practices includes a component derived from the capital invested in the enterprise. In the case of income from partnerships (or S corporations), the SOI data shows that,
of about $107 billion 135 net income (less deficit) of partnerships in
1995, over $37 billion came from services. 136 For our initial analyses,
we ascribe 75% of income from partnerships and S corporations to
wages. U sing these figures, we determine a percentage of AGI derived from labor.
An influential model by Arnold Harberger argues that the corporate income tax is a uniform burden on all capital, not just capital
134

Statistics of Income, note 99.

m $178.7 billion net income, less deficit of $71.8 billion.
136 $49.6 billion of net income, less $12.1 billion deficit. This data comes from Timothy
Wh ee ler. IRS, Statistics of Incom e 1995: Partnership Returns 43, 54-66 tbl.l (1997) .
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invested in corporate form. 137 Some would restrict the burden of the
corporate tax to capital invested in corporate form. 138 That issue does
not affect our analysis, which is concerned solely with the question of
whether capital or labor is burdened. Attacks that are more serious
for our purpose come from those who argue that the corporate tax can
be shifted to labor. 139 These analyses would shift part of the burden
of the corporate tax away from capital. In an important work, Joseph
Pechman summarizes various opinions on the incidence of the corporate tax. 140 Under most views, all of the corporate tax burdens capital.141 Under some alternatives, however, as much as one-half of the
tax is shifted away from capital. 142 For purposes of our initial analysis,
we assume that 75% of the corporate tax is a burden on capital. 143
With the assumptions above, we find that the total burden of the two
income taxes falls on capital to the extent of 28% and on labor to the
extent of 72%.
If we constrain the wealth tax so that the wage portion raises 72%
of the revenue, we have a unique solution. We find that we can raise
the amount raised by the individual and corporate income taxes with
tax rates of 17.7% on wages and 1.57% on net worth. We refer to this
combination of rates as the base case.
If we sought only to replace the individual income tax, the relative
amounts of tax on labor and capital would change. We estimate that
approximately 84% of the personal income tax falls on labor. Using
that constraint, we find that we could raise sufficient revenue to re137 Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. Pol. Econ.
215 (1962).
138 Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85, at 32 (1985).
139 See, e.g., Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 436 (4th ed. 1995); Richard A. Musgrave
& Peggy G. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 387-89 (5th ed. 1989); see
also Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics 178 (1980)
("The Harberger analysis provides considerable insight into the different factors at work,
but it is premature to draw the firm conclusion ... " that capital bears at least the full
burden of the corporate income tax.)
140 Pechman, note 138.
141 Id. at 35-37.
142 Id.
143 The CBO has used " three corporate tax incidence variations in recent years, sometimes treating the tax as borne by owners of capital, sometimes treating the tax as borne by
labor ... and sometimes allocating the tax half to labor and half to capital." Michael J.
Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 642 (1995). Jeffrey
Kwall argues that because "stock ownership tends to be concentrated among high-income
individuals," those individuals with higher incomes tend to bear the incidence of the corporate tax . Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate
Income, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613, 635 (1990) (citing ALI, Federal Income Tax Project, Subchapter C, Proposals on Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions and Reporter's Study on
Corporate Distributions 328 (1982) , Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Federal Income Tax Aspects of
Corporate Financial Structures 57 (1989)).
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place the personal income tax with tax rates of 17.1% on wages and
.75% on net worth.
E.

Alternative Designs of the Wealth Tax

In this Subsection, we examine how rates would change under various alternatives to the base case. We examine the effects of altering
the net worth base and changing the level of the exemptions. For purposes of this Subsection, we assume that the wealth tax would replace
both the personal and corporate income taxes. Except as otherwise
indicated, we also assume that the wage portion of the tax would raise
72% of the revenue. All of the rates discussed below are shown in
Table 13.
TABLE

13

TAX RATES UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

Description of Base
Base case
Full inclusion of housing
Same - keep net worth tax at base
Exclude housing, permit deduction for
Same - keep net worth tax at base
Include retirement assets
Same - keep net worth tax at base
Include retirement and housing
Same - keep net worth tax at base
Reduce credits by 50%
Double credits
Wage tax only
Net worth tax only

1.

rate
mortgages
rate
rate
rate

Net worth rate

Wage rate

1.57
1.26
1.57
1.71
1.57
1.12
1.57
0.96
1.57
1.44
1.75
0.00
5.70

17.7
17.4
16.0
17.8
18.2
17.8
15.7
17.6
14.0
14.5
22.8
23.0
0.0

Housing

Under the base case, we excluded net housing equity up to $1 million. We also estimated tax rates under two alternative scenarios. In
the first, we assume that housing is fully taxable. That is, we fully
include both housing assets and mortgages in the tax base. In the second, we assume that housing is exempt but permit mortgages up to $1
million to be included in the tax base (that is, to reduce net worth).l 44
In the base case, $4.7 trillion of net housing is excluded.l 45 Thus, if
housing is fully included, the asset base increases by $4.7 trillion and
144 Recall that exempting houses and deducting mortgages is essentially the same treatment as under the current income tax.
145 Figures for housing do not properly take into account the non-PEU individuals. It is
unlikely that the results will change significantly when they are taken into account.
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tax rates drop to 17.4% on wages and 1.26% on net worth. 146 If housing assets are exempt, but housing liabilities were included, the
amount of the housing exemption would increase to $7.4 trillion and
rates would increase to 17.8% on wages and 1.71% on housing. Thus,
the treatment of housing has a significant effect on the necessary tax
rates. Finally, if we freeze the tax rate on net worth to the base case
rate of 1.57%, the rate on wages would fall to 16% in the no-housingexclusion case and would rise to 18.2% in the housing-excluded/mortgages-included case.

2.

Retirement

We would like to estimate the effect of including retirement wealth
in the tax base as we make our other estimates. Currently, however,
our data on retirement wealth is insufficient at the household level to
make such an estimation. We are able to get a rough idea of the effect
of excluding retirement wealth by assuming that there is a separate tax
on retirement wealth at the same rate as the net worth tax and that no
credits are allowed against the retirement tax. As discussed above,
our estimate of retirement wealth based on the SCF is $3 trillion. The
estimate for pension fund reserves in the Flow of Funds accounts is
$4.88 trillion. The Flow of Funds estimate, however, does not include
amounts in IRAs or Keoghs. According to the SCF, there is $1.22
trillion in IRAs and Keoghs. Thus, overall, our best estimate of retirement assets is $5.10 trillion, the sum of the Flow of Funds figure and
the SCF figure for IRAs and Keoghs.
At the base case rate of 1.57%, a tax on retirement wealth would
raise $80 billion. If rates on net worth were held constant, the rate on
wages could decrease from 17.7% to 15.7%. If we maintained the
capital/labor constraint, the rates would be 17.8% on wages and
1.12% on net worth, including retirement wealth.
Finally, if both retirement wealth and housing were included, tax
rates would drop to 17.6% on wages and 0.96% on net worth. Alternatively, if we froze the net worth tax at 1.57%, the wage tax could fall
to 14.0%.

146 The scrupulous reader may be puzzled that an increase in an item included in the
worth base should cause the tax rate on wages to decrease. The reason is that an increase
in any part of the base causes some previously untaxed people to become taxpayers. To
the extent they have wages, a portion of their wages is treated as taxed. Thus, an increase
in an item that is included solely in net worth causes the base for both parts of the wealth
tax to increase, reducing the tax rates required. In a wealth tax with no credit, this would
not occur.
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Sensitivity of Rates to Credit Lev el

As discussed above, the base case includes two personal nonrefundable tax credits, a $1,500 credit per head of household and an additional per person tax credit of $400. To test the effect of the level of
the credit on tax rates, we compute rates under two alternative
scenanos.
Under the low-credit scenario, we decrease both credits by 50% to
$750 and $200 for the head of household and per person credits, respectively. Tax rates decrease to 1.44% on net worth and 14.5% on
wages. Under the high-credit scenario, we double the credits to
$3 ,000 and $800. Tax rates increase to 1.75% on net worth and 22.8%
on wages.
Under the base case, the potential amount of credits is $364 billion.l47 Of these potential credits, taxpayers are able to use credits of
only $311 billion. Under the low-credit scenario, credits used would
decrease to $242 billion. Under the high-credit scenario, credits used
would increase to $378 billion.

VIII.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE WEALTH TAX

We argued above that under the income tax, large amounts of income from capital are either untaxed or taxed at much reduced effective rates and that as a result, it was possible to replace the income tax
with a flat wealth tax and achieve much of the progressivity of the
income tax. In this Section, we test that hypothesis.
A central question in distributional analysis is the classification of
the taxpaying population. If one felt that economic income was the
best indicator of the well-being of a taxpayer, the appropriate question would be how the burdens of alternative tax systems are distributed among various income groups. On the other hand , if wealth is
really the best indicator of well-being, distribution should be made on
the basis of wealth classes. For that matter, if consumption were the
best indicator, distribution should be made based on consumption. 148
Defining the variable is an equally daunting task. Thus, for example , if one were to use wealth as a classification variable, it would be
necessary to define what was meant by wealth. The most serious difficulty in defining wealth would be in determining how to treat human
capital.
We have not resolved the question of the best classifying variable.
Fortunately, in order to answer the question that we posed, we do not
need to determine the best classifier. We posited that much of the
147
148

See Table 11 on page 555.
The SCF generally does not have data on consumption .
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progressiVIty of the income tax can be replicated by a single rate
wealth tax. Thus, the task we set for ourselves is best accomplished by
using the same classifying variable as one would use for an income
tax. 149 The progressivity of the income tax conventionally is measured
using some form of income as the classifying variable. Accordingly,
we have chosen to compare the progressivity of the income tax as
measured against income to the progressivity of the wealth tax also as
measured against income.
Next, we need to define income. For now, we have chosen AGI as
our classifying measure. We are aware that extended measures of income frequently are used and are believed to be superior to AGI as
classifying variables.l 50 Our primary reason for choosing AG I is the
constraints imposed by our data. Moreover, we believe that AGI is a
reasonable measure, although it is clearly not perfect. We hope to
refine our classifying variable in future work.1 51
As long as we intend the wealth tax to replace the corporate, as well
as the personal income tax, we need to find a way to incorporate the
corporate tax into our comparative distributions. As mentioned earlier, it has been argued that the corporate income tax is a burden on
all investments in capital. 152 To compare the distribution of the
wealth tax to the distribution of the combination of the personal and
corporate income taxes, we allocate the latter to classes of individuals
based on the relative net worth of individuals in each class.l 53
The data on income tax payments by AGI class comes from the IRS
SOl publications. We compute the wealth tax using the SCF data
under our base case, a 1.57% flat net worth tax combined with 17.7%
wage tax. Credits allowed are $1,500 for heads of household and $400
for each household member. We distribute that tax according to the
AGI figures reported in the SCF.

149 We understand that the fact that people measure the progressivity of the income tax
by reference to income does not, in any sense, mean it is the best measure. Even, however,
if we were able to determine the perfect classifier, we still would need to decide the correct
level of progressivity given that classifier. Both determinations would require a far more
elaborate model than we develop here.
150 Treasury, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the Congressional Budget Office
each use somewhat different measures of income as classifiers.
151 For example, the SCF contains data on tax-exempt bond holdings. Thus, we could
impute exempt interest. Similarly, we could impute income on certain forms of retirement
assets and on housing. If we wished to compare the distribution of the income tax and the
distribution of the wealth tax, we also would need either to impute income tax figures to
the SCF households, or otherwise to distribute income taxes paid by our chosen classifier.
152 Harberger, note 137.
153 We are aware that our method of allocating the corporate tax here is different from
the method we used earlier. We intend to resolve this inconsistency in future research.
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As with most data in the SCF, the AGI figure in the SCF is selfreported and unverified. 15 4 Moreover, while in some cases, the AG I
refers to a figure on an already filed tax return , in other cases, it refers
to a figure on a return that is expected to be fil ed. 15 5 We have, however, no reason to believe that there is a systematic bias in the reporting of AG I.
There are additional problems with our analysis. First, the SCF is
based on responses with respect to PEUs. By contrast, IRS data is
based on the filing of tax returns. A PE U can file more than one tax
return. Thus , for example, if a couple reports AGI of $100,000, we
classify them as a single taxpayer with AGI of $100,000. In fact, however, they may have filed two returns, one with , say, $80,000 of AGI,
and the other with $20,000 of AGI. The SOI data would classify them
according! y.
We have some ability to split the SCF data into two separate returns. For example, where the PEU is he aded by a couple (whether or
not married), the SCF asks respondents whether they filed joint or
individual tax returns.l 5 6 Where more than one tax return was filed
by the couple, we have tried to construct two separate wealth tax returns for the PEU. We have not used these separate returns, however,
in the distributional analysis that follows.l 57 We also have not attempted to create additional wealth tax returns for other members of
the PEU, such as children.
A further problem concerns the non-PEU members. They are
about 19 million individuals, not a trivial group.l 58 The sketchy information we have shows that they have assets of $181 billion and earned
income of $172 billion. 15Q PEUs consist of 237 million individuals, 16 0
with net assets of $19 trillion and earned income of $4 trillion.l 6 1
Thus, non-PEU individuals are about 7% of the population, with 1%
of all assets and 4% of all earned income. Non-PEU members would
pay wealth tax of $14 billion in the base case, about 2% of the tax.
154 Adjusted gross income is reported in Variables X5751, X7651 , and X7652 Uoint return , separate return for head of household, separate return for spouse/partner, respectively). SCF, note 104.
155 Id. Variable X5744.
156 The filing of joint returns in the data does not always correspond with marital status.
In some cases SCF respondents report themselves as being not married, but filing joint
returns.
157 The information on separate filing is used to compare the number of filin g units in
the SCF data set to the number of filing units reported by SOL See Figure 16, Appendix.
158 See Table 10 on page 555, and text following note 130.
159 See Table 7 (assets) , on page 552, and Table 8 (earned income) , on page 553.
160 See Table 7, on page 552.
161 See Table 6 (assets), on page 551 , and Table 8 (earned income) , on page 553.
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Unfortuna tely, we have no data on their AGI. 162 Accordingly, \ve had
to estimate ;\.G I for non-PEU members. In order to do so , \Ve ha ve
assumed that their AGI is equal to their wage income plus any income
that is iden tified as being within certain categories th at are li kely to
form part of AG I.1 63 Although we would like to be able to refi ne our
measure of AG I, we do not believe that any refinem ent would have a
significant effect on the analysis. Moreover, since non-PEU memb ers
generally have low income and assets, any refinement would be likely
to have an effe ct only in the lower AGI categories.
A final point is that the IRS data has no info rmation on th ose who
do not file tax returns. The SCF includes about 20 million nonfilers. 164
A.

Distributional Results

The graph in Figure 5 shows the distribution of th e wealth tax by
AGI class.165 A lso included on the graph is the distribution of the
personal income tax and the combination of the personal and corporate income taxes.
The main finding is that, from $15,000 to $500,000 of AGI, our fla t
rate wealth tax comes close to reproducing the progressivity of the
current income tax, which has explicitly progressive rates. Below
$15 ,000 of AGI (the "low income range"), the wealth tax is significantly more burdensome than the income tax. We are neither surprised nor disturbed by the level of wealth tax in the low income
range. To begin with, it is important to identify low income individuals who would not be taxed more heavily under the we alth tax. As
can be seen from Table 5,166 those with earned income under $15 ,000
and no (or small amounts) of taxable wealth are taxed more lightly
under the wealth tax than under the income tax. Table 5 shows both
the income tax liability and the wealth tax liability for taxpayers with
certain combinations of marital status and number of children. The
162 In addition. as discussed above, whe re there are multi ple non- PEU membe rs in a
ho usehold, we have no ability to separate them into filing uni ts. Accordingly, we assume d
that all non-PE U members in a single ho usehold consist of a single fi ling unit
163 For no n-PEU members, the SCF has only two income variabl es: wages (X6403 ) and
a composite vari able of income from other sources (X6415 ) (" other income" ). SCF. note
104. The SCF also has a series of variables that indicates whether other income includes
particular types of inco me. We have included othe r income in AGI where it incl udes pen sions, interest, dividends, busin ess income, real estate income, or unemployme nt compensa tion. In such cases, however, other in come also may include other types of in come th at
sho uld not be included in AGI.
164 There were 137 million fil ers in th e SCF , about 87% of all heads of households being
fi lers . Id. Note that we have no data on tax returns filed by non-PE U members.
165 Additional perspective on Figure 5 can be gained by looking at Figures 15 and 17 in
th e A ppendix, which show aggregate wealth tax and aggregate AGI by AGI ca tegory.
166 See page 548.
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wealth tax liability is always less than the income tax liability. For
example, a married couple filing jointly and taking the standard deduction had an income tax liability in 1994 of $578, but would have
zero wealth tax liability. The greatest wealth tax liability for a taxpayer with $15,000 of earned income would be for a single individual
with no children, who would owe $800. U nd er the income tax, however, her liability was $1,320. Both the income tax data and the
wealth tax data exclude the earned income credit, which generally has
been excluded from our analysis.
We believe that the wealth tax is greater than the income tax in the
low income range because the wealth tax taxes two categories that the
income tax may not tax: retired individuals with substantial wealth 167
and wealthy individuals whose income is low because of losses suffered in the current year. We think it is appropriate to increase tax
liability on such individuals.
The other region where the wealth tax would have a significantly
different distributional effect than the income tax is the region above
$500,000 and particularly above $1 million of AGI (the "high income
range"), where the burden of the wealth tax plummets. We find the
behavior of the wealth tax in the high income region disturbing. We
are uncertain as to the cause of the drop in the tax burden. One possibility is that the data is flawed. While the SCF makes every effort to
obtain a valid high wealth sample, there are inevitable weaknesses in
their data.l 68 For example, even if Bill Gates responded to their postcard, his answers could not be released in the public data set without
inevitable disclosure. It also may be the case that those with high AGI
systematically under-report their wealth.1 69
167 As a reminder of what we mean by substantial we alth, note that a single retired
person with no wages and $200,000 of savings would be subj ect to a tax of $3,136, but
would have a head of household credit of $1 ,500 and an individual credit of $400. Thus, the
individual would pay a tax of only $1,236. A retired married couple with $200,000 of savings would pay no wealth tax because their credits would be $3,800. If the United States
were to move from an income tax to a wealth tax, one major problem would be how to
treat retired people, whose wealth already has been subject to an income tax. This, and a
host of other transitional issues, are not considered in this Article.
168 The SCF sends a postcard to a sample of high income individuals asking for their
participation in the survey.
169 Another problem with the SCF is that it explicitly excludes the very richest individuals. Arthur B. Kennickel, Using Income Data to Predict Wealth, (SCF Working Paper, Jan.
1999), available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/oss/oss2/papers/wealth.income.6.pdf>,
at 1 ("(the SCF sample] specifically excludes very prominent individuals, including members of the 'Forbes 400"'). For 1996, Forbes reports that the richest 400 people in the
United States have wealth of over $400 billion. Ann Marsh, The Forbes Four Hundred,
Forbes, Oct. 14, 1996, at 100. According to the SCF, in 1994, the richest 398 people in the
United States had wealth of $99 billion. We tried increasing the wealth of the top 398
persons in the SCF by a fac tor of fo ur. The effect on the distribution was not large.
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We have examined some of the data on a case-by-case basis to see if
we can understand the cause of the decline in the burden. In doing so,
we found some anomalies that could provide a partial explanation of
the results, but such inquiries have been only preliminary.
An example of an anomalous data point is an individual in the SCF
who reports $5 million in AGI. The SCF attributes about $500,000 of
salary to this individual.1 70 Where does the other $4.5 million of income come from? The individual owns a home worth $160,000, subject to a mortgage of about that amount. The individual has a small
checking account and no other assets. Under the weighting system
used by the SCF, this data point represents almost 10,000 households,
making it a significant point among households in the high income
range. Yet, his wealth tax is relatively small, only about 18% of his
$500,000 salary, making it seem that the burden of the wealth tax is
relatively light on those with high AGI. Dropping this one data point
from the sample improves the results, but only slightly.1 71 We have
identified some other data points that we view as anomalous, but we
have not yet formalized the process of handling outliers.
We continue to investigate reasons for the behavior of the wealth
tax in this region.l 72 Ultimately, if we conclude that the problem is in
our design and not in our data, we will consider the possibility of a
high-net-worth or high-wage surtax. Hopefully, such a tax could be
aimed only at the highest wealth individuals without seriously disturbing the administrative benefits of the tax.
Figures 6-12 contain graphs showing the distribution of the wealth
tax under different scenarios. Figure 6 shows the effect of taxing
earned income only. As expected, the wealth tax becomes significantly less progressive. It is noteworthy that the tax drops for individuals with over $1 million of AGI, suggesting that part of the reason
the wealth tax is regressive at the highest AGI levels is the drop in
earned income in the high income range.
170 The language in the text is chosen with care. Not all respondents answer all questions in the SCF. To make the SCF useful, and to allow researchers to make reasonable
statistical determinations based on its data, some information is imputed to complete
otherwise incomplete records. The records indicate when such imputations have been
made. Thus, in respect of this record, the $5 million of AGI is not imputed, but the salary
information is imputed.
l71 On a number of occasions, we pointed out to the SCF staff data in the SCF that
appears anomalous. They have been extremely responsive and where appropriate, have
made changes to the data or the codebook. When we pointed out this particular anomaly,
they told us that no change would be made. They did not (and, because of the need to
keep the identity of the underlying respondents confidential, very possibly could not) explain to us their reasons.
172 For example, we have considered the possibility of using more detailed tax return
data to validate the distribution of AGI in the high income range. The use of the Forbes
data discussed in note 169 is another example.
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Figure 7 shows the effect of a tax on net worth only. The tax does
an excellent job of tracking the income tax except in the low income
range and the high income range. The high tax rates in the low income range support our theory that there are individuals with low
AGI and high wealth. As compared to the base case, the net-worthonly-tax imposes higher burdens on high income individuals.
Figure 8 shows the effect of including all housing. As expected, including housing makes the wealth tax somewhat less progressive, presumably because housing wealth represents a greater proportion of
wealth for low and middle income individuals.
Figure 9 shows the effect of excluding housing while permitting
mortgages to reduce net worth. Interestingly, the results are almost
identical to those of the base case shown in Figure 5. This suggests
that permitting a deduction for mortgages while excluding housing
would have the detrimental effect of raising marginal rates, while having no appreciable effect on distribution.
Figures 10 and 11 show the effect of lowering and raising the credits
respectively. When the credits are cut by one-half, the wealth tax becomes significantly less progressive, indicating that the credits are a
substantial source of progressivity. When the credits are doubled, the
wealth tax becomes substantially more progressive, while still showing
increased average tax liability in the low income range and decreases
in the high income range when compared to the income tax.
Finally, Figure 12 compares the personal income tax to a wealth tax
that replaces only the personal income tax. Again, the wealth tax
does a good job of tracking the income tax, except in the low income
and very high income ranges.
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CoNcLuSION

Our results so far encourage our belief that it is worthwhile to investigate what a flat-rate wealth tax (including an earned income component) might look like in the United States. Whether or not such a
tax is ever enacted, a serious consideration of the tax provides insight
into the current income tax as well as other potential tax systems.
On an administrative level, we believe that a wealth tax can provide
significant simplification. We recognize, however, that there are at
least two serious administrative weaknesses to a wealth tax. First, and
most obviously, there is the need to value assets and liabilities in order
to determine net worth. Second, there is the need to distinguish between a return from capital (which would be tax-free) and a return
from labor (which would not be).
As a distributional matter, we are encouraged that, through most of
the income range, a flat-rate wealth tax can be at least as progressive
(measured against income) as is the current income tax. We would be
disturbed by a tax that was significantly less progressive and suspect
that there is little political support for a tax that is significantly more
progressive. We are troubled, however, by the drop in progressivity in
the high income range. We are hopeful that a more detailed examination of the underlying data will allow us to provide a fuller explanation of our reported results.
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APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SCF DATA AND
CoMPARISONS WITH SOl DATA.

In this Appendix, we provide additional information on the SCF
dataset and comparisons of the SCF dataset and data from SOL
Figures 13 and 14 show, by AGI category, total net worth and total
earned income subject to tax under the base case. Each column in the
graphs is divided into primary economic units and non-PEU members.
Figure 15 shows total tax by AGI figures for the personal income
tax, the combined personal and corporate income taxes , and the
wealth tax (under the base case).
Figure 16 shows a comparison of the number of filing units by AGI
categories under different approaches.
The first bar in each set shows the number of filers for the current
income tax based on SOl data. The second bar shows the number of
primary economic units in the SCF. Where spouses (or partners) in a
primary economic unit file separately, the SCF reports their separate
AGis. The third bar uses this data to create separate filing units. Finally, the fourth bar adds in filing units composed [RS: oF?] on nonPEU members.l 73
Figure 17 shows a comparison of the total AGI by adjusted gross
income categories. As with Figure 16, the first bar is from SOl data.
The second bar includes only primary economic units and treats each
primary economic unit as a single filing unit. The third bar divides
primary economic units into two filing units when the survey indicates
that the spouses (partners) filed separately. Finally, the fourth bar
adds in data from non-PEU members.

173 None of the bars on the graph corresponds directly to the analysis in the body of the
Article. In particular, the main analysis treats the primary economic unit as a single filer,
but also treats all non-PEU members in a household as an additional filing unit.
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